(The series is an analysis of the draft peace pacts exchanged between the government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front peace panels on January 27, 2010 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF did not show up for discussion the next day claiming the GRP [Government of the Republic of the Philippines] presented nothing new, that it offered “enhanced autonomy” again, an offer rejected in 2000 and 2003.

The two panels met again on March 4 in Kuala Lumpur for a Q and A session on the MILF’s draft Declaration of Principles on Interim Governance Arrangements, an 11-page extract from its proposed Comprehensive Compact. The GRP peace panel vowed to submit its counter-proposal but as of March 18, panel chair Rafael Seguis told MindaNews he has not submitted it because “I have to clear with the National Security Cabinet Group.”

Dialogue Mindanaw, a series of consultations organized by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), is supposed to “engage the people by informing them about the issues being discussed in the GRP-MILF peace talks, and by securing their honest feedback on these issues”

OPAPP Secretary Annabelle Abaya announced before Mindanao’s state university presidents who attended a peacebuilding conference in Penang, Malaysia in January that the Dialogue Mindanaw consultations will be specific as to the issues the government and MILF peace panels will be discussing at the negotiating table.

“The idea is to get back to the people on the issues they (panels) are discussing. What do they want?“ Abaya said.

But issues like “state-sub-state relationship” which was allegedly part of the proposal of the MILF in late January, has not been discussed in the consultations.

MindaNews’ Patricio P. Diaz got hold of copies of the draft peace agreements exchanged on January 27 from sources who asked not to be named.

This series is intended to help the readers understand the drafts and the issues being resolved now. Prof. Rudy Rodil has also written a separate commentary — MindaNews editor)

I. The Agreed Guidelines

GENERAL SANTOS CITY – From the various reports of the stalled peace talks of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the inference is: The peace process to arrive at a political solution to the Mindanao Problem is not in a state of impasse; rather, it is in a state of by-pass: the MILF is resisting and the GRP is insisting on.

This interesting, yet intriguing, twist in the Kuala Lumpur negotiation the GRP and the MILF drafts of agreements tell, the media reports notwithstanding.

[Author’s Note: Incidentally and presumably, in response to my latest three-part COMMENT: “Peace Pact Still Possible?”, posted in MindaNews February 16, 20, 21 and 22, sources who asked not to be named sent copies of the GRP and MILF Drafts]

Moral Issue

The present stalled negotiation raises the moral issue of sincerity and honesty. The two Parties – GRP and MILF – have agreed to follow the talks agenda. On reading the Drafts, it is to be wondered: How sincere and honest are they to their agreements?

A year after the Supreme Court restrained the Government from signing the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) and later declared it unconstitutional, the two Parties “re-established official contact” on July 29, 2009 and issued the four-point “Joint Statement” to do so. This is a key reference of the resumed peace talks.

Joint Statement acknowledged the following:

1. Mutual effort to sustain the Government’s Suspension of Military Offensives (SOMO) and the MILF’s Suspension of Military Actions (SOMA).

2. Acknowledgment of MOA-AD as an unsigned and yet initialed document, and commitment by both parties to reframe the consensus points with the end in view of moving towards the comprehensive compact to bring about a negotiated political settlement;

3. Work for a framework agreement on the establishment of a mechanism on the protection of non-combatants in armed conflict;

4. Work for a framework agreement on the establishment of International Contact Group (ICG) of groups of states and non-state organizations to accompany and mobilize international support for the peace process.

What does Item 2 imply? Since the MILF never abandoned the MOA-AD, the acknowledgment of it as an “initialed document” was solely that of the GRP after having disowned it publicly and before the Supreme Court.

The GRP and the MILF, in committing “to reframe the consensus points with the end in view of moving towards the comprehensive compact to bring about a negotiated political settlement”, agreed to re-start the talks from where they had stopped – the initialed MOA-AD. That is a defining statement.

In so agreeing, the MILF acknowledged the Decision of the Supreme Court and, by extension, the 1987 Constitution. However, the Court ruling should be noted well:

Its final resolution reads: “The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION.”

Paragraph 4 of the Summary of the Supreme Court’s October 14, 2008 Decision reads: “The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.”

What are to be noted well?

First, the Court declared unconstitutional only the MOA, not the AD as an aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001.

Second, the Court recognized the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 and the series of agreements already done to carry it out. The Court acknowledged the MOA-AD as a significant part of that series.

Third, the Court restrained the Government from signing the MOA-AD; however, on recognizing its significance to the GRP-MILF peace negotiation, it recommended three options to save the peace process: (1) renegotiate it; (2) draft a new one with similar provisions; or, (3) draft another with significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the unconstitutional MOA-AD.

Item 2 of the four-item agreement of the July 29, 2009 Statement is consonant with these options.

On December 9, 2009, the GRP and MILF agreed to cut short the negotiation by exchanging draft agreements drawn up following a seven-item guideline: (1) Identity and citizenship; (2) Government and structure; (3) Security arrangement; (4) Wealth-sharing, natural resources and property rights; (5) Restorative justice and reconciliation; (6) Implementation arrangement; (7) Independent monitoring.

The seven-item specific guideline, another key reference of the resumed peace talk, is consonant with Item 2 of the July 29 Statement and the final ruling of the Supreme Court on the MOA-AD. To reiterate the moral issue: Do the GRP and MILF draft agreements adhere to their agreed guideline? The drafts will tell how sincere and honest the Parties are.

Restatement

The Supreme Court decision recommends three options to revive the negotiations on the Ancestral Domain aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 2001.

The GRP-MILF Joint Statement of July 29, 2009 is a general agreement to reframe the consensus points of the MOA-AD to re-start the peace talks and move it toward the Comprehensive Compact.

The December 9, 2009 Seven-Item guideline sets the details of the Joint Statement as reference of the two Parties in drafting their Peace Agreement Proposal to shorten the negotiation to five months or less.

Last March 10, 2010, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Nur Misuari faction, held its 4th Bangsamoro People’s National Parliament (BPNP) in Lanao del Sur. I understand Prof. Nur Misuari was there himself. The BNP came out with a curious resolution, among others, that needs to be reacted upon.

Among the resolution is a warning – repeat, warning – to Malaysia not to block the implementation of the GRP-MNLF 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA). We find this curious, not to say outrageous, because we don’t see the relevance of this particular resolution which points an accusatory finger at Malaysia on the presupposition that the latter is blocking the FPA.

Our brothers in the MNLF, most of whom are, or became, Philippine government officials or employees are barking at the wrong tree. Is this “warning”, which is an open display of arrogance, an oblique reference to Malaysia’s facilitation of the MILF-GRP peace negotiations? The nuance seems to indicate so. Regardless of the reason, Malaysia, which is a member-state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), has never blocked the implementation of the MNLF-GRP 1996 FPA.

To call a spade a spade, if there is an entity that is responsible for the non-implementation of the FPA, it is the Philippine government (even the OIC now realizes this); and if there is an obstacle to it, it is the FPA itself that provides that obstacle! This infirmity in the FPA is very clear that even a high school student who reads English will not fail to notice it if he were to go through it thoroughly. Why did our brothers in the MNLF accept this infirmity? They themselves signed this document!

Come to think of it, brothers and sisters, how can you even urge the UN to recognize the right of self-determination of the Bangsamoro people when you, yourselves, recognized, acknowledged and accepted without question in the FPA the supremacy of the Philippine constitution and all “existing laws” over you? The Philippine government can easily demolish your arguments before any international body using the FPA as a ‘weapon’ against you.

Unless you abrogate, nullify and void the FPA your legitimacy as “sole spokesman and representative” of the Bangsamoro people holds no water. It’s mere rhetoric that doesn’t mean anything.

Let me quote the ‘Totality Clause’ of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement: “This Peace Agreement, which is the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, embodies and constitutes the totality of all agreements, covenant and understandings between the GRP and the MNLF respecting all the subject matters embodied herein. This Agreement supersedes and modifies all agreements, consensus, covenants, documents and communications….Any conflict in the interpretation of this Agreement shall be resolved in the light of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws.” (underscoring mine)
With this ‘Totality Clause’, the MNLF has provided the Philippine government with all the excuses, pretexts and reasons for obstructing the implementation of the FPA on the basis of the Philippine constitution and “existing laws”. So who’s to blame? Malaysia? Come on! Grow up, my brothers and sisters in the MNLF! You’ve been had at the negotiating table. Admit it.

I hate to say this (and it bleeds our hearts even to think of it) but you’ve been defeated politically by the adversary.

But you also personally benefited from this defeat by accepting plum positions in government, foremost of whom is MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari who became regional governor of ARMM and is now running for governor of Sulu for the second time in the May 10 Philippine elections. Now that many of you are out of power, or about to be out of power, you’re whimpering like small children deprived of their goodies. Stop these childish acts and unite with your brethren in the MILF instead of issuing resolutions with ridiculous ‘warnings’ which people never even give a hoot about. For once, think revolutionary and act revolutionary! We are all brothers and sisters in Islam, brothers and sisters in the struggle for our people’s right to self-determination, and sons and daughters of the Moro Malay nation. Let not the fitna of our adversary come between us.

Again and again, the MILF has stated that it is not negotiating with the Philippine government solely for the MILF but on behalf of the entire Bangsamoro people. These include us, you and me, and all those brothers and sisters who may or may not even be supportive of the MILF.

Brother Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and the entire leadership of the MILF stand on the firm ideological and political position that we have to struggle together as a nation – one Moro nation – regardless of organizational affiliation, ethno-linguistic identity or class status. ‘Unity in struggle and struggle for unity’ is the call of the time.

Can you not see that?

Let us, therefore, do away with these foolishness and stupidity, stop blaming those who have helped us and are helping us rise from this dire condition we are in today because of colonialism.

Contemplate on this: seriously and objectively.

-end-

As the Armed Forces of the Philippines intensifies its aerial and ground bombardment of Moro communities in Mindanao and starving of Moro refugees with military food blockades to collect the multi-million peso rewards on the heads of MILF commanders Ameril Ombra Kato and Abdurrahman ‘Bravo’ Macapaar, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been repeatedly announcing to the public the ‘new peace strategy’ of her regime in confronting the conflict in Mindanao. The President, says her spokesmen, has changed the rules of the game. No longer will she be holding peace talks with armed groups but directly with the communities. Also, any dealings with the MILF shall be in the context of DDR: demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (rehabilitation, as her spokesmen erringly put it).

From these pronouncements, it is clear that the Arroyo regime has abandoned the Mindanao peace process. After the aborted August 5 MOA-AD signing ceremony in Malaysia, the nationwide anti-Moro and anti-Muslim campaign, and the consequent fighting in Central Mindanao, Jesus Dureza, the presidential mouthpiece, informed all and sundry that the regime would no longer sign the MOA-AD “in its present form or in any other form”. Arroyo even followed this up by disbanding the government peace panel.

Here, there is no room for misinterpretation. Insofar as the Arroyo regime is concerned, the MILF-GRP peace negotiation is plain and simple kaput. Just like that. There is really no ‘new peace strategy’. There is no more ‘primacy of the peace process.’ Everything else is pure rhetoric. The reality is that it’s back to the old but profitable business of war. I am pretty sure the warmongers are jumping with joy. Behind the scenes, there would be a lot of back-slapping: “We’re back in business, boys! We’re back in business!”

No in-depth analysis is needed to understand that Arroyo’s ‘peace strategy’ is pure nonsense. It’s a lot of bull, to use a Yankee colloquialism. Peace negotiation with communities? What communities? Moro communities? The political aspiration of the Moro people has always been articulated and represented by the Moro liberation movement. Hence, if government wants a negotiation it has to deal with the Moro liberation movement. That means the MILF. That the regime will be negotiating with ‘communities’ – assuming these are Moro communities – and not with the Moro liberation movement is like performing shadow boxing.
This begs the question: What about DDR?

By putting forward DDR, the Arroyo regime has made it obvious that it does not want to conclude a peace agreement. What it wants – nay, demands – is the surrender of the MILF. But no revolutionary organization worth the name would succumb to such an outrageous demand or condition. And the MILF is a revolutionary organization. Brother Al Haj Murad, the Amirul Mujahideen and Chairman of the MILF, has made this very clear on several occasions. The Arroyo regime knows that the MILF would outrightly reject this absurd precondition for the resumption of talks. So by demanding for the impossible, the regime really does not want the talks to resume. Or, reconsider signing the MOA-AD. It appears now that everything was orchestrated, including the aborted signing, so that the talks would crumble. And it did crumble. That’s the harsh reality. That’s the inside story.

So where does that leave us? As I said, back to a state of war. Before the onset of the Holy Month of Ramadhan, I could hear these foreboding words of our brothers reverberating in the four corners of the Moro Homeland:

“Brace yourselves, brothers and sisters, the ‘Castilians’ are coming! They will bomb our homes, pillage our communities, put torch to our masajid, haul or young boys to prison as ‘terrorists’, and portray us as Dracula in their daily moro-moro. So brace yourselves! Man the barricades!”

Today, as we watch from a distance the smoke-filled air over the devastated Moro villages of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Saranggani, Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, these words of warning have come alive. The brown ‘Castilians’ are already here causing mayhem. And even during Ramadhan! But thank Allah, Most High, there are brothers ‘manning the barricades’.
But seriously, now that the peace process under the Arroyo regime is dead as in dead, the persistent question that a young former Moro neighbor is bugging me with is: will there be life for the peace process after Arroyo?

Pondering over this question intently, I saw that my former neighbor has a point – as a matter of fact, all the relevant points – in pestering me with this question. I asked myself also the same question until it dawned on me that the only way to answer this is to have a rundown of who the Filipino ‘presidentiables’ are in 2010, the year Arroyo leaves office (and I hope for good).

I abhor Philippine politics because it’s neo-colonial (in Islamic terminology, it is jahili politics) and therefore rotten. So, I never took interest in finding out who the presidentiables are lining up for the elections in 2010. I never even vote in all elections, national or local. I spent the best years of my youth in the struggle against Filipino regimes and presidents who had our Moro homeland invaded and devastated. I am one among the many Moros who holds a Filipino passport by force of circumstance.

But going back to the issue, if the peace process were to be revived it will be under a new regime, a new sitting president. The MILF-GRP negotiation was jettisoned by Joseph Estrada in 2000 when he waged all-out war against the MILF; but it was revived when Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over the presidency in 2001. The perception now is when Arroyo steps down in less than two years’ time there is the likelihood that the peace process will also be revived back to life. Or will it be?

But to satisfy my former Moro neighbor’s persistent question as well as my own curiosity, I made a short list of Filipino presidentiables using as yardstick their recent reactions to and/or views on the MOA-AD.

The first on the list would be Vice-President Noli de Castro, being next in line to the exiting Arroyo. As an aside, I don’t think he is even worth being considered a serious contender for the presidency. To the bourgeois elite, De Castro lacks the qualification, particularly the ‘intellectual sophistication’, for becoming president. In the recent brouhaha over the MOA-AD, he was conspicuously silent. He had no stand of his own and played safe staying quietly at the sidelines while his political colleagues in and out of government took turns lambasting the Moros, who happen to be the compatriots of his Moro wife. But then again, De Castro’s weaknesses might just be his strengths. To the exploitative Filipino ruling elite, he could be a useful tool, a puppet president.
Intellectually deficient, yes, but that would even make him a good puppet-on-a-string. As such, he would be a glorified servant of the powerful anti-Moro and anti-Muslim blocs, particularly the conservative Church and reactionary Big Business, which dominate the political and economic scene in the Philippines.

Under a De Castro presidency, the peace process might be revived but it will be a peace process with no direction, a peace process designed to perpetuate the status quo in Mindanao. It will all be for show to keep the international donors’ money flowing into the pockets of the corrupt Philippine officialdom. That kind of a peace process is a dead one. So forget it.

The second on the list of presidentiables is Senate President Manny Villar. Senator Villar has not been as vociferous as the other Filipino politicians in opposing the MOA-AD.
Nevertheless, he is against it. He is part of Big Business and the latter has vast economic interests in Mindanao. This being the case, Villar will oppose any peace process that will give the Bangsamoro people the kind of economic concessions and political rights contained in the MOA-AD. To the Moros, short of the MOA-AD agenda, there is no talking point in any resumption of negotiation. But Villar will not stand for resuming talks based on the MOA-AD.

He will ‘play safe’ by demanding that any peace talks be within the framework of the Philippine constitution. Therefore, there will never be a meaningful peace negotiation under a Villar presidency. Besides, Villar will also be looking forward to the next presidential election and I don’t think he can dare antagonize the mighty political and economic power blocs that really rule the country.

The third on our list is Senator Mar Roxas. There’s nothing more to be said about Roxas, a grandson of a Philippine president who also played a part in the colonization of the Bangsamoro Homeland.

Mar Roxas, an Ilonggo, has vehemently opposed the MOA-AD for two basic reasons: 1. inherent dislike for the Bangsamoro people which he probably ‘inherited’ from his colonialist forebears; and 2. fear that that the signing of the MOA-AD will set the stage for charter change leading to an extension of the term of Arroyo, thus aborting his plan to become president by 2010. Under a Roxas presidency, there might not even be peace talks between the MILF and the Philippine government. It should be noted that the Roxas family acquired political power and wealth under the status quo whose ‘bible’ is the Philippine constitution. So, Roxas is definitely hopeless. Perhaps, the only thing he knows about the Moros is that they are a source of ‘ghost votes’ during election time. And indeed, like Villar’s mindset, there is always a second term to look forward to. ‘Ghost voters’ from the ARMM will be useful to Mar Roxas so he cannot afford to give the Bangsamoro people the kind of freedom they want and need that is in the MOA-AD.

The fourth on the list is former senator Franklin Drilon. Like Roxas, Drilon is an Ilonggo. He heads the opposition wing of the Liberal Party. He is also a rabid opponent of the MOA-AD. In his one page-ad in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Drilon’s presentation of the MOA-AD for easy understanding by the public was good. But it was his conclusion that really mattered. He exposed his Filipino chauvinistic animus for the Moros by parroting the lie that the MOA-AD leads to Moro secession.

Drillon is a brilliant lawyer. Of all the presidentiables, he is perhaps the most intellectually capable of understanding the ‘Bangsamoro Problem’. But as a typical Filipino trapo (traditional politician) whose reactionary mindset is attuned to that of the anti-Moro Filipino settler-politician in Mindanao, Drillon does not want to understand the ‘Bangsamoro Problem’. He strongly denies and opposes the assertion of Bangsamoro identity. This refusal to understand the ‘Bangsamoro Problem’ he has craftily mantled in the rhetoric of defending the Philippine constitution.

So goes for Senator Cheez Escudero, another presidentiable. Or so they say. The Senate neophyte is popular for his ‘cause-oriented’ opposition to the Arroyo regime. But I guess Escudero’s past association with the deposed Joseph Estrada who had unleashed an ‘all-out-war’ in 2000 against the Bangsamoro people has left an indelible mark on his mind.
Escudero, a self-styled ‘Filipino nationalist,’ is among the most vocal oppositionists to the MOA-AD. By going against the MOA-AD, Escudero revealed his true colors: justice is only good for the Opposition, not the Moros. If he were to become president, we might have another ‘Erap’ in the making.

Another presidentiable on the list is the glamorous Senator Loren Legarda, a vice-presidential candidate who lost to De Castro in the last election. The problem with Loren is that she doesn’t even know whether to become a billboard ad model or be serious in her job as a government official. If she becomes president, a friend predicted that town and city streets as well as highways from Jolo to Aparri would all be adorned with those gigantic billboards displaying multi-colored pictures of hers in different poses endorsing a variety of cosmetic products and the latest fashion or announcing her projects for the nation.
Legarda is close to some members of the Moro elite. She was even given an honorary title as ‘Bailabi So-and-So’ in Lanao del Sur. That, however, doesn’t make her sympathetic to the Moro cause or an expert on the ‘Bangsamoro Problem’. In fact, her true feelings came out when she, too, opposed the MOA-AD. Assuming she becomes president, it is possible she would revive the peace talks though not to endorse the MOA-AD but to promote a cosmetic product! Pardon the pun.

Second to the last on our list is Senator Panfilio ‘Ping’ Lacson, another loser in the last presidential election. Nothing more can be said about Ping Lacson that the public, especially the Moros, does not already know. He was Estrada’s hit man during the incumbency of the former. It was during his watch as head of the Philippine National Police (PNP) under the Estrada presidency that four innocent Moro Muslims were brutally executed gangland-style on a street in Quiapo, Manila, by the police in broad daylight. The poor Muslims who were applying for jobs abroad were suspected, judged and executed all at one time as ‘MILF terrorists’. And this does not even include the many Muslims detained and/or who disappeared when Lacson was PNP Chief.

Ping Lacson doesn’t worry or care about human rights. He is a bully who does not believe in due process, no thanks to his stint as a Philippine Constabulary ‘enforcer’ during the dark days of the Marcos dictatorship. He is one of the architects of Estrada’s all-out war debacle in Mindanao together with Angelo Reyes, then the Chief of Staff of the AFP. Under a Lacson presidency, there might not even be a peace negotiation let alone the revival of one.
At the bottom of the list is Joseph ‘Erap’ Ejercito Estrada. I included the latter because of his recent innuendos that he might stage a political comeback “if the Filipino people demand it”. He still has a lot of fanatic followers who are unbelievably mesmerized by his movie antics being played out in real life. Knowing Philippine politics, it would not be difficult for a political has-been like Erap to invoke ‘the Filipino people’s demand’ and take the center stage in the fight for the Philippine presidency.

In the recent controversy on the MOA-AD, it is evident Erap never learned from his past blunders when he unleashed an all-war on the Bangsamoro people in 2000. From his lair in a posh suburban village in Metro-Manila, he continues to rant not only against the MOA-AD but against the MILF. He boasts that if he were still the president, the ‘Bangsamoro Problem’ would have been solved by his ‘pupulbusin-ko-kayo‘(“I will pulverize you”) military formula. Everyone knows the only ‘victory’ that Erap gained from his foolish military adventurism in Mindanao, Basilan and Sulu was a Pyrrhic one and that was when his troops ‘captured’ at a very high price a small piece of real estate inside Camp Abu Bakr As-Siddiq. He failed to literally reduce the MILF to smithereens as he arrogantly boasted to the public. This ignoramus cannot live a day without being inebriated so much so that he does not realize until now that the MILF’s tactical withdrawal from a small part of Camp Abu Bakr cannot be compared to his humiliating ejection from Malacañang and the subsequent public shame he was subjected to as a result of the venalities of his regime.

Nevertheless, Erap is one guy who holds extreme contempt for the Bangsamoro people, the MILF and Islam and if he were to become president again, he would declare the “Fall of Camp Abu Bakr” a national holiday and order all mosques throughout the country to celebrate it with imported wine and lechon.

Negotiation, you say? Under Erap, no way. This man has the mentality of a gangster. Just like the underworld characters he played in his B-grade movies.
I was considering including in my list the likes of Senator Richard Gordon and Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. but their chances of being presidentiables, while not nil, are slim. But even assuming that they stand the chance of becoming presidents, these two also opposed the MOA-AD.

Pimentel is a big disappointment to the Moros because he hails from Mindanao and is an advocate of ‘Mindanaoan’ rights. It turned out, however, that he is no different from the rest of the Filipino politicians. All talk but no sincerity and commitment.

I likewise ignored House Speaker Boy Nograles, who is from Davao City, because though he ranks third or fourth in the government hierarchy, he hasn’t as yet made any open manifestation of joining the presidentiables. It is very unlikely that he would. He is not that popular to the Filipinos in the North. Like Pimentel, Nograles was a fervent advocate of federalism. When he became Speaker of Congress, this advocacy fizzled out like a strong typhoon hitting land and turning into a mere rain shower. Temptations of power have overcome this spineless ‘Mindanaoan’ who cannot even voice out a whimper of protest against the atrocious devastation that militarization is now causing in Mindanao.

Another presidential aspirant not on my list of presidentiables is Bayani Fernando, head of the Metro-Manila Commission (did I get the name of the office right?). In fairness to him, he never said a word for or against the MOA-AD. But the man is a joker, a nondescript character. He is better off trying his luck singing and dancing on TV ? la ‘American Idol’ than vying for the presidency. Or, even better, directing traffic in Metro-Manila. Perhaps the only Moros he knows are those impoverished Muslim ‘squatters’ (refugees from the past wars in Mindanao) he was trying to eject from that reclamation area in Pasay City.
There are also showbiz people and religious leaders of Christian charismatic groups who are toying with the idea of becoming presidentiables but I omitted them. These people are all clowns who think of the Philippine presidency as the apex of their showbiz career or the ultimate pulpit from where bible-thumping preachers-turned-politicians could promise to ‘rain’ manna on the poverty-stricken masses though not from heaven but from Malacañang. This is the crowd that doesn’t give a damn about what happens to the Moros.

I showed my former Moro neighbor my list plus the corresponding observations I made and he concurred with my analysis. Finally, he also agreed with me that only a Filipino president fully in control of government and with the caliber of the late French President Charles de Gaulle or even a Vicente Emano of Cagayan de Oro can we say with a degree of certainty that there is going to be life for the peace process after Arroyo.

I mentioned Vicente ‘Dongkoy’ Emano, the non-Muslim vice-mayor of Cagayan de Oro City, because he was the only official who openly opposed the military operations in Mindanao and who declared that the Moro cause is a just cause. This he boldly declared in a large gathering of Mindanao officials that included Moro governors and mayors whose lips were zipped for fear of displeasing the current regime.

Meantime, however, with the kind of presidentiables arrayed before us, my former Moro neighbor now shares my doubt as to whether 2010 can bring the peace and justice that our people have been longing for; unless, of course, Allah gives us a miracle. He knows best. But until then, this is how the situation stands.

As a footnote, a few days after I last met up with him, I saw my former Moro neighbor carrying a backpack waiting at the public terminal for his ride. It was the end of Ramadhan and the ‘Id’l Fitre congregational prayers had just been concluded. I asked him where he was going and he gave me a glowing smile I would never forget. Then he whispered, “I am joining the mujahideen.” That was all and except for the ‘salaam’ and customary fraternal embrace, he left without another word.

-end-

It is widely believed that economic growth and development have bypassed the southern regions of the Philippines. This is seen as the cause of the serious political problems that now plague Mindanao. A closer look at Mindanao’s economic development, however, reveals that far from being isolated from the mainstream of the national economy, the island has been a major performer and a primary contributor to the country’s productive capacities.

Lured by vast reserves of natural resources, business concerns have invested capital and technology and established ventures that have generated enormous profits for their owners and executives. But the resulting wealth and incomes have not benefited the greater majority of its people. Poverty and other social indicators point to a more distressed condition for Mindanao residents than for the nation as a whole.

This paradox of high growth rates and the simultaneous existence of an impoverished population have challenged scholars and development planners for many years. In the Mindanao case, this enigma is exacerbated by the effects of internal colonialism – the transfer of wealth from the southern regions to the nucleus of economic and political power in the north.

Demography

Mindanao, together with the Sulu Archipelago, occupies a land area of 10.2 million hectares or one-third of the country’s area of 30 million hectares. The historian B.R. Rodil’s classifies Mindanao’s population of 18.13 million as of 2000 into two major categories – the indigenous peoples and the migrant settlers. The indigenous population can be further classified into three groups. The first are the Islamized peoples (a.k.a. Moros) who number 3.63 million or 20 percent.

The second indigenous category is composed of the Lumad population who number 907,000 persons (6 percent). Some of these are the Manobo, Bagobo, B’laan, Higaunon, Mamanwa, Mansaka, Manuvu, Subanen, T’boli, and Teduray peoples. The third indigenous category number around 900,000 (5 percent) and is composed of the Visayan-speaking Christianized population of Northern and Eastern Mindanao and the Chavacano speakers of Zamboanga and Basilan who were already in Mindanao when the Spanish arrived in the 17th century.

Approximately 70 percent of the Mindanao population is composed of settlers who arrived in the 20th century from Luzon and the Visayas as part of government resettlement programs. Predominantly Christian, they also include the Chinese settlers and those belonging to the third indigenous category. Together with the third indigenous category, this group constitutes about 13.6 million people (75 percent).

There are, at the moment, six politico-administrative regions: Region IX (Zamboanga Peninsula), Region X (Northern Mindanao), Region XI (Davao Region), Region XII (SoCCSKSarGen), Caraga Region, and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). A total of twenty-eight (28) provinces and nine (9) chartered cities belong to the six Mindanao regions.

Mindanao’s Contribution to the National Economy

Mindanao’s large productive base enables it to contribute significantly to the country’s economic growth. Its forest area comprises 41 percent of the country’s vegetative cover and 56 percent of Philippine commercial forest land. It produces 73 percent of the national value added in the forestry sector. Fifty-six percent of total Philippine commercial forest land is in Mindanao. More than half of timber licenses issued in the country are granted for Mindanao operations. Mindanao wood products such as plywood, veneer, and lumber comprise over 90 percent of the country’s total production. Mindanao’s exports accounts for 70 percent of logs, 52 percent of lumber, over 90 percent of plywood, and 92 percent of veneer.

Its agricultural area of 3.73 million hectares comprises 38 percent of the country’s total farm area. The island produces 43 percent of the Philippines’ agricultural output. Overall, Mindanao supplies 40 percent of the country’s food requirements and 30 percent of the national food trade.1

Commercial and export crops are planted in about 51 percent of farm area and includes coconut, tobacco, rubber, sugar, export bananas, palm oil, coffee, abaca, and fruits. Commercialized agriculture has been on the rise with its land utilization and growth exceeding that of food crops.

The waters around Mindanao and Sulu contribute 32 percent of the country’s total fishery products and more than half of the country’s total commercial fish catch. Tuna fishing has become the country’s number one fishery sector with major export markets in Japan and the US. Thirteen Mindanao fishing firms based in the cities of General Santos and Zamboanga export about 80 percent of the country’s tuna.

The Philippines is the world’s leading producer of coconut and coconut products and more than half of the country’s coconut area is in Mindanao. More than 60 percent of Philippine copra and coconut oil exports come from Mindanao. Most of the country’s coconut oil mills are based in Mindanao. Agriculture, fishery and forestry production in Mindanao combine for 36 percent of value added for these three sectors of the country.

Rubber plantations in the Philippines are exclusive to Mindanao with some 60,000 hectares in planted area. Sugarlands in Mindanao total 56,000 hectares with three large sugar mills in Bukidnon, North Cotabato and Davao del Sur. The Bukidnon-based BUSCO has an ultra-modern mill funded by the Japan Import-Export Bank. Mindanao is also the main producer for coffee (75 percent) and for one-third of the country’s livestock products.

In the minerals sector, Mindanao’s share of the national total is about 25 percent. Gold, copper, nickel, chromite and coal are the major mining products of Mindanao as well as silver, zinc, and lead. The world’s largest nickel reserves are in northeastern and southern Mindanao. In February 2010, Sumitomo Metal Mining Company announced plans to invest $2.11 billion over three years to expand its nickel operations in Surigao del Norte.2 Gold and copper are extensively mined in the Agusan and Davao provinces. Five companies in Mindanao produce Portland cement including the country’s biggest and modern cement manufacturer, Bacnotan Consolidated Industries in Davao City.

Mindanao accounts for one-fourth of the country’s total export receipts. Its coconut products account for 43 percent of the country’s coconut exports, while wood products corner 60 percent of the national total. The country’s export fruits industry is composed almost entirely of bananas and pineapples. One hundred percent of these exports, comprising 90 percent of Philippine fruit exports come from Mindanao.

In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), however, Mindanao’s contribution appears less significant. In 2003, the island’s GDP of P192 billion was only 18 percent of the national total. The same year, Luzon’s share was 66 percent. Northern Mindanao had the highest GDP share of 27.1 percent of Mindanao’s total. The Davao Region was next with 25.4 percent while Soccskargen was in third with 20.1 percent. The Zamboanga region was fourth with 14.8 percent, Caraga fifth with 7.6 percent while ARMM was last with only 5.2 percent.

Mindanao’s growth rate, though less than the national rate and behind that of Luzon, is not that far behind. Between 1990 and 2000, Mindanao grew by 22.7 percent compared to the national rate of 24.4 percent. Between 1995 and 2000, Mindanao’s average GDP growth rate of 3.69 percent was only slightly less than the national average rate of 3.76 percent and of Luzon’s 3.97 percent. From 2003 to 2007, Mindanao’s average growth rate rose to 5.02 percent, with the 2007 growth rate alone standing at 6.91 percent.

Despite lagging behind the rest of the country based on several economic indicators, Mindanao enjoyed a positive trade balance in 2003 of US$707 million compared to the country’s negative trade balance of US$1.7 billion. Despite this overall positive note, interregional disparities still characterize Mindanao trading patterns with the Davao and the Soccskargen regions having the highest surpuses. In 2007, Mindanao exports totaled $2.6 billion while imports amounted to $1.2 billion, or a trade surplus of $1.44 billion.

Capital Formation

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lists a total of 3,954 corporations in Mindanao who registered between 2002 and 2008 with a total paid-up capital of P2.81 billion. Measured against the national figures, Mindanao’s new firms was only 3.46 percent of the Philippines’ total and 2.61 percent of paid-up capital.

The Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCO) announced that, in 2008, 40 investment projects valued P13.7 billion were registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). This constituted a 72 percent growth from the 2007 figure. MEDCO further reported that local investments almost doubled in value from P6.124 billion in 2007 to P12.004 billion in 2008 or a 96 percent increase. This surpassed the record set in 1998 of P9.5 billion.

Foreign Investments

According to the MEDCO, direct foreign investments registered for 2008 in Mindanao had a total value of P1.704 billion. Sixty-percent of these were Japanese investments in power generation sector, marine and petroleum products. Canadians were second with 21 percent mainly in the mining business. The British and South Koreans shared 4 each and were engaged in the export of Cavendish banana, petroleum products and coco peat/coco fiber business.

Foreign and foreign-affiliated firms (FFCs) in Mindanao operate in 21 categories of product and industry lines. The wood products industry had the most number of participating FFC firms, with 16; followed by manufacturing with 13; fishing and fish products, 12; banana production, 9; mining, 7; and coconut products, coffee, and cacao (cocoa) with 6 firms each.3

In terms of regional and provincial distribution, the FFCs operate in 119 locations in Mindanao. Many firms are present in several provinces and even several towns in one province. The Davao region is the major host of FFC operations with 50 locations (42 percent) followed by Northern Mindanao with 30 locations (25 percent) while the Zamboanga region has 28 (24 percent).

Infrastructure Development

In her 2009 State of the Nation Report, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced the completion of several major infrastructure projects in Mindanao including the P2.1 billion 882-meter Diosdado Macapagal Bridge in Butuan City, the 210 MW Clean Coal-Fired Power Plant, the 1-megawatt Solar Power Plant in Cagayan de Oro City, the P572.87-million Cagayan de Oro Port and the P420.22-million Davao Port.

Airport projects include the P700-million Butuan Airport Upgrading Project; the P600-million Cotabato Airport Rehabilitation Project; the P478-million Dipolog Airport Improvement Project and the P215-million Ozamis Airport Development Project; the P545-million Pagadian Airport Development Project; and the P423.50-million Zamboanga Airport Improvement Project have already been completed.

A major undertaking is the Cotabato-Agusan River Basin Development Project (CARBDP) which was implemented from 1975 to 2000 with an initial cost of P15.7 billion covered 11 provinces or one-third of Mindanao’s land area. It was funded mainly by foreign loans from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and Japan. The project budget has since ballooned such that for 1998 and 1999 alone, total allotments for the project reached P173 billion. Total project assets reached P331 billion by 1999. The Lower Agusan Development Project is the newest component of the CARBDP and consists of two phases with a total project cost of P2.18 billion.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US mainland, Mindanao has been given increased attention by foreign donors under the assumption that the Moro separatist movement is somehow linked to a global Islamic militant movement. This is not to say that donors did not pay attention to Mindanao in the past. The World Bank had, in 1998, committed US$10 million for the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) Social Fund Project following the signing of a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has, since 1996, also provided grants under various programs in Mindanao that, as of 2006, totaled US$292 million. Following the post 9/11 pattern, USAID assistance almost tripled after 2001 from US$90.6 million in 1996-2001 to US$242 million in 2002-2006.

As of September 2006, there were 21 active ODA loan projects in Mindanao totaling US$917.75 million. Ten of these were Japan-funded projects, with loan amounts amounting to US$473.04 million, or 52 percent of the total for the area. All these projects, plus the grants program of USAID are ostensibly meant to advance the peace building process in Mindanao. Japan had earlier launched in December 2002, a “Support Package for Peace and Security in Mindanao.”

In April 2003, President Macapagal-Arroyo launched what has been dubbed a “Mini-Marshall Plan” called “Mindanao Natin” worth P5.5 billion in government funds and US$1.3 billion in ODA funds for the next three to five years. The program targeted 5,000 Muslim villages in Mindanao’s regions, but the figures as of December 2006 show that not all of the announced projects got off the ground. For example, the World Bank’s commitment of US$279 million for four projects was eventually pared down to one project worth only US$34 million.

Aside from the “Mindanao Natin” initiative, a multi-donor Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP) has been established with the World Bank as the lead donor and Secretariat Coordinator. Other donors are the European Commission, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, and UNDP. Also known as the Peace Fund, MTF-RDP identified the rehabilitation needs of MILF combatants, MILF communities and indigenous peoples (IPs) estimated to cost US$400 million.

Development Strategies

Mindanao development strategies are driven essentially by the Philippine state’s objective of integrating the southern economy into the national mainstream. The focus is on large-scale infrastructure development to attract investments in export-led and market-driven growth industries. The aim is to open up more of Mindanao’s natural resources to exploitation and extraction with the private sector as the prime mover. Scarce attention, however, is paid to the actual needs of Mindanao’s peoples such as directly addressing poverty and inequality which are the principal causes of social unrest and rebellion.

During Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian rule (1972-1986), such strategies were formulated in the midst of increasing social tensions, the depletion of the land frontier, land concentration and agrarian conflicts, and the marginalization and impoverishment especially of the Moro and Lumad peoples. Post-Marcos development strategies did not differ essentially from the previous regime. Whether these be Corazon Aquino’s regional industrial centers, Fidel Ramos’ Mindanao Investment Development Authority (MIDA) and Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (Bimp-Eaga), or Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s “Mindanao National Initiatives” (Mindanao Natin), the basic premises, principles, and thrusts have remained unchanged.

In 2006, President Macapagal-Arroyo launched what she called the Super Regional Development Strategy, which is meant to “harness the common competitive advantages of a cluster of regions and provinces.” The country was then divided into five Super Regions with “Agribusiness Mindanao” being one of them. As the name implies, Mindanao is to focus on agribusiness as its “competitive edge,” particularly in the cultivation of “high value crops.”

In January 2010, Congress passed a bill creating a Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) which seeks to accelerate growth and development by putting in place a central planning agency for Southern Philippines. MinDA is to replace and strengthen MedCo and provide the strategic direction for Mindanao by formulating an integrated regional development framework.4

Echoing Macapagal-Arroyo’s initiative, MinDA would focus on agribusiness as a major area for economic development. It is doubtful, however, whether Mindanao’s hope lies in agribusiness, which, at the moment, already occupies a central place in the island’s economy. Agribusiness activities have caused more problems than solutions for Mindanao’s people, through environmental degradation, human rights violations, corruption, health problems, and wealth transfers.

Human Development Pitfalls

Despite the decades-long economic growth thrusts in Mindanao and apart from the economic disparities engendered by the unequal economic relations within the island and between Mindanao and the rest of the country, basic human development indicators reveal that economic growth has not benefited Mindanao’s peoples.

Using the human development index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Mindanao provinces fared badly compared to other Philippine provinces. Mindanao’s average HDI was only 0.635 in 2003, or 15 percent lower than the national HDI of 0.747. Seventeen out of 24 Mindanao provinces were in the bottom half of the national list. Worse, nine of the bottom ten provinces were all located in Mindanao. No Mindanao province placed in the upper fifteen percent. The bottom four provinces were all from Muslim-dominated provinces.

In the per capita income category, Mindanao had an average of only US$1,546 which is a mere 41 percent of the national per capita income of US$2,609. Furthermore, eight Mindanao provinces occupy the last eight places among the 77 provinces of the country and twelve of the last 14 places. Four of the twelve lowly-ranked provinces are Muslim dominated and are part of the ARMM. The highest nationally ranked Mindanao provinces, South Cotabato at 17th with US$2,223, Davao del Sur at 18th with US$2,158, Camiguin at 20th with US$2,110, and Misamis Oriental at 25th with US$2,045 all still had per capita incomes that were lower than the national average.

Poverty incidence in Mindanao is consistent with the island’s low standing in the national human development index. Its average poverty incidence of 42.4 percent in 2003 was 40 percent higher than the national average of 25.7 percent. Four Mindanao provinces, however, had poverty incidences lower than the national average of 25.7 percent: South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Davao del Sur, and Davao del Norte. On the other hand, six Mindanao provinces had exceedingly high poverty incidences, greater than 50 percent: Sulu (88.8%), Tawi Tawi (69.9%), Basilan (65.6%), Zamboanga del Norte (63.2%), Maguindanao (55.8%), and Siquijor (51.9%). Another seven provinces had poverty rates of between 40 percent and 47 percent in 2003.

Between 2000 and 2003, thirteen Mindanao provinces experienced a deterioration in their poverty situation. Large increases in poverty were registered for Maguindanao (by 19.6%), Surigao del Sur (by 14.4%), Davao Oriental (by 13.4%), Zamboanga del Norte (by 11.3%), and Surigao del Norte (by 8.2%). Nationwide, five Mindanao provinces were cited as among the ten top losers in poverty reduction incidence between 2000 and 2003: Maguindanao, Surigao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, and Surigao del Norte.

Inequality measures for Mindanao reflect wide disparities in income distribution and consumption patterns among its population. Its 2003 average Gini index of 40.8, however, although better than the Philippines national index of 43.9, represented a decline from the 2000 index of 36.4 points. On a province-by-province assessment, 21 out of 24 Mindanao provinces suffered declines in their inequality measures between 2000 and 2003.

Another measure of poverty is the subsistence incidence or the capacity to satisfy food requirements. For the country as a whole, 13.8 percent of the population was living below the subsistence food threshold and was thus unable to meet their food requirements in 2003. For Mindanao, however, all its regions registered lower capacities than the national average. The Zamboanga and Caraga regions had the worst record as the two landed at the bottom of the list of 17 Philippine regions with 32.8 (17th) and 31.8 (16th) respectively. Taking all six Mindanao regions, the subsistence incidence was 24.88, or 11.1 points higher than the national figure. This is an ironic situation given Mindanao’s reputation as the Philippines’ food basket, supplying 40 percent of the country’s food requirements and 30 percent of the national food trade.

Development Issues

Massive infrastructure projects in Mindanao generate social costs. Large-scale irrigation projects cause small farmers to lose substantial areas of their already small holdings. Site selection takes place often without the participation of the affected population and, sometimes, the selected sites are wrongly identified as uninhabited lands.

Furthermore, tribal communities lose their ancestral lands and their cultural heritage. More often than not, compensation for the loss of lands is not given. But how does one compensate for the loss of cultural heritage? Disruptions of cultural and religious practices by hydroelectric projects have been denounced by Islamic communities around Lake Lanao.

Large-scale projects entail high construction and maintenance costs. And it has been shown that small irrigation systems and scaled-down hydroelectric units can do the job just as well with lower costs and less social displacements. Large irrigation projects are also major pollutants since several irrigation systems discharge their return flows to only one major river, thus depriving families living on river banks of safe water supply. In addition, huge dams cause reduced soil fertility.

The major industries in Mindanao are of the extractive type which exploit and deplete natural resources. The rate of depletion of forests and fishing grounds is alarming and unfortunate because these are, after all, renewable resources. On the other hand, industries dependent on non-renewable riches such as minerals pose long-term risks for their dependent workforce, once total depletion occurs. In the tuna fish sector, lack of supply sometimes forces canneries to import fish.

Dislocation and displacement has often accompanied the entry and expansion of corporate operations in Mindanao. Scores of tribal Filipinos and settler communities have also been dislocated by logging operations in northern and southern Mindanao. The expansion of pineapple production by Del Monte in Bukidnon has pushed local communities off their lands. Also in Bukidnon, ancestral lands belonging to Manobo communities have been grabbed by cattle ranchers who then sold the lands to the Bukidnon Sugar Corporation.

The extensive monocropping patterns of agribusiness corporations dependent on high levels of chemical applications cause depletion of soil nutrients. In the case of the banana and pineapple industries, it is feared that once their operations cease, the badly damaged soil would not be able to sustain any other crop for many years. The cultivation patterns of pineapple plantations erode the soil, adversely affecting neighboring farmlands.

Depletion of resources without adequate replenishment measures ultimately damages the environment. Periodic flooding in logged-over areas in Northern Mindanao causes deaths and render thousands homeless. Extensive use of chemicals in farms disturbs the ecological balance in the area. Pineapple plantations encroach into watershed areas “causing substantial damage due to floods,” and small farmers complain about “the massive land destruction caused by floods from plantation areas during the rainy season.” Northern Mindanao’s coastal industrial belt, which includes cement factories, chemical plants, mineral processing factories and coconut processing plants, has been a major source of pollution.

Extensive use of agricultural chemicals by agribusiness operations also poses health hazards. Banana workers are endangered by exposure to harmful chemicals as plantation owners often do not institute health and safety measures, and doctors and nurses at these farms are not trained in occupational safety methods. There are thousands of victims of pesticide poisoning in the plantations. Aerial spraying of pesticides by banana companies has become a major issue in the area.

Most industries in Mindanao are export-oriented, dependent on the vagaries of international trade over which local producers have no control as the products they export are of low value added and do not fetch premium prices. Price instability and uncertainty thus affect Mindanao products such as coconuts, wood products, bananas, pineapples, minerals and fish. In the pursuit of the volatile export market, local needs are sacrificed. In the case of the fishing industry, the growth of an export sector has raised the prices of fish in the local market and put it beyond the reach of poor families.

Despite the expansion of economic activities in Mindanao, the southern economy has remained largely underdeveloped with features characteristic of a dependent type of capitalism. The emphasis on exports and TNC dominance has stunted local initiatives for developing an economic base with a higher level and quality of processing and manufacturing.

Processing activities have not gone beyond preliminary manufacturing stages and center on export-oriented goods. The wood industry, one of the oldest sectors, remains dependent on the intermediate processing of logs and lumber into plywood and veneer. Import dependence also characterizes a large number of these industries. The export fruit sector depends on the import of expensive chemical inputs to maintain high production levels. The Kawasaki sintered-ore plant imports almost all of its raw materials of iron ore and coke. The exceptions are agricultural and fish processing but being food products, their net value added is relatively low. The economic underdevelopment of Mindanao would explain its low share of the country’s gross domestic product.

Wealth Transfers and Internal Colonialism

There is no doubt that large amounts of wealth have been created from Mindanao’s abundant resources. Where all this wealth goes can be traced to the pattern of income distribution among different social classes and regions in Mindanao, the uneven development of the country’s regions and the relations of dependency between countries of different states of development.

In the first place, in Mindanao’s industries, the owners of the means of production capture a disproportionately larger share of the surplus than the workers while granting the latter less than a living wage. Second, within Mindanao itself, the more affluent regions, i.e., Davao and Northern Mindanao, take in a greater share of the income. Thirdly, the Mindanao regions are being drained of incomes by more developed northern regions. Fourthly, on the international plane, and as a result of the dominant role of transnational corporations in virtually every aspect of the various industries in Mindanao, wealth and resource transfers also occur in the direction of the developed economies of the world.

Internal colonialism theory describes and analyzes “the distribution of power and advantage within states” between a center and a periphery …where economic resources and power are concentrated at the center, to the advantage of which the periphery is subordinated.”5

This situation is clearly evident in the Mindanao case. The data show how large volumes of copra from Mindanao farms are shipped to Cebu and Manila and fish products caught in Mindanao waters are unloaded in Manila and Iloilo ports. Corporations operating in Mindanao usually have their main offices in Metro Manila, where they pay their taxes, thus depriving local governments of revenue. Internal colonialism would explain why, despite the presence of massive government projects and highly profitable industries, the Mindanao regions remain poor and deprived.

Conclusion

Mindanao has been the object of relentless economic exploitation since the turn of the 20th century. This process has produced immeasurable wealth and riches for a few mostly non-Mindanaoan firms and individuals. But it has also generated poverty and social marginalization for its working population, whether Moro, Lumad, or working class Christian settlers. Furthermore, its natural resources are being depleted at an uncontrollable pace stoking fears of an ecological backlash.

In the meantime, the Manila government is bent on accelerating the same age-old patterns of inequitable growth that have long deprived Mindanaoans of their just share of the economic surplus. The country’s leaders must initiate a process of constructing a new development paradigm for Mindanao that will finally render social and economic justice for Mindanao’s peoples. The grim alternative will be the continuation of the cycle of violence and warfare that have long characterized the southern Philippines.

__________

The author is a professor of Asian Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman.

This essay is based on a presentation made at the UP Academic Congress, Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines Diliman, 2 February 2010. It is an essay version of a paper revised and updated from two previous studies by the author: “The Political Economy of Mindanao: An Overview” in Mark Turner, et al (eds), Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise(Quezon City: New Day Publishers) 1992 and “Mindanao Briefing Paper” (2007) a research report submitted to the Consuelo Foundation. For the updated data, the research assistance of Sascha Gallardo is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-2010, p. 34.

2 Riza T. Olchondra, “Sumitomo to invest $2.1B in Surigao mine project,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 February 2010, p. B5.

3 The data on TNCs in Mindanao are based on studies conducted in the 1980s and need to be updated for changes that have taken place, particularly in the plantations which have since been placed under the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The general picture, however, remains valid.

4 Bernard Allauigan, “New Mindanao development body gains ground,” Business World, 19 January 2010 and Tina Arceo-Dumlao, “Fulfilling the promise of growth in Mindanao,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 January 2010.

5 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (London, 1975). See also David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in South-East Asia (Routledge, 1994) pp. 158-205.

I will not add to the remarkable details and lucid insights assembled in the analysis of my mentor, Mr. Pat Diaz. What I will do is to view the problem from another angle.

In the first place I ask the question. Is it the Moro problem we are trying to solve? Or the GRP problem?

If it is the Moro problem, it has been with us since 1968, almost 42 two years to date.

A series of major Moro organizations articulated Moro aspirations. The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) said it wanted to put up an Islamic State in predominantly Muslim areas of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan (Minsupala). President Ferdinand Marcos responded by appointing its leader, former Cotabato Governor Datu Udtog Matalam, as presidential adviser on Muslim affairs. The organization died but the seed had been sown.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) emerged immediately after and loudly proclaimed the birth of the Bangsamoro, and their intent to liberate the Bangsamoro from the clutches of Philippine colonialism and establish a Bangsamoro Republic in Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan, their ancestral homeland. The war netted more than 100,000 lives and cost the government more than seventy billion pesos in combat expenses alone. The GRP-MNLF peace negotiations that followed produced the Tripoli Agreement which established the Autonomous Region for the Muslims of Southern Philippines. It took 20 years before the two parties could agree on how to implement. Finally in 1996, they signed the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, but 13 years have passed and the government has yet to fully implement its provisions. And the government admits it.

Perceiving that the Bangsamoro cause has been compromised, the MILF refused to accept the 1996 agreement and announced its resumption of the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination. From January 1997 to the present, two big events were happening at the same, an active war in 13 provinces of Mindanao-Sulu Archipelago and a peace negotiation. Over the years the MILF has narrowed down its pursuit to the creation of a political entity somewhere in between the present autonomy and independence and very much an integral part of the Republic of the Philippines.

So, if I may reiterate, what is the GRP problem?

Since the time of President Marcos, from the first negotiating panel to the 18th, yes, Chairman Rafael Seguis is the 18th panel chair on the government side, the GRP position has been consistent: to uphold national sovereignty and the integrity of the Philippine territory; it agreed to negotiate but only within the framework of the Philippine constitution. The constitutional part became more specific in Article X of the 1987 Constitution. But the Moro problem remains unsolved.

This was why the Tripoli Agreement was acceptable to the GRP. It is new in Philippine political history, has 16 paragraphs and paragraph 16 says that the entire agreement was to be implemented in accordance with constitutional processes. It took 20 years for the two parties to agree on what that exactly means. But despite the 1996 accord, the GRP seems hesitant to fully implement it.

Thoughtful military officers who have fought in the Moro front since they were junior officers claim that the military has fought for 40 years; between 100,000 to 120,000 lives have perished, 50 percent were MNLF, 30 percent were AFP, and 20 percent were civilians; Php 73 billion have been spent in combat expenses alone. But the Moro problem is still there very much alive and kicking. It is obvious to them the war is not the answer.

In the negotiation front, the constitution is the main GRP framework for solution. The GRP is on its 18th peace panel chair and the same framework has been used. This is perfectly understandable. Every government employee as a matter of fact must swear to uphold the constitution as soon as he or she joins government service. How much more peace panel members who represent the republic through the office of the President. Still the Moro problem remains. Can we also say the constitutional solution is faulty?

It might help clarify a number of things if we review a series of interrelated events in Mindanao history.

The first event is the Treaty of Paris. Every Bangsamoro peace panel, whether MNLF or MILF, claims that they have never been colonized by the Spaniards but the Spaniards included them in their cession of the Philippines to the United States without their plebiscitary consent.

As a Mindanao historian who has done more than my share of historical research I know this to be true. As an assertion of our Filipino point of view, I should add that at the time of the Treaty of Paris, December 1898, it is doubtful if there was any part of the Philippines that Spain owned and could cede to the United States because the Filipino revolutionary leaders had declared Philippine independence in June of the same year.

The Cordillera was one territory she never colonized; the same may be said of Lumad communities which retained their independence through avoidance of contact with the Spanish forces. So, it is not only the Bangsamoro who should complain that they were never asked whether or not they wished their territory to be part of the Philippines; the Filipinos, too, and the Cordillerans and the Lumad – colonizers do not ask colonial victims for their consent. All this, of course, becomes moot and academic because we lost in the war against the Americans. As a consequence, we all became colonial subjects of America, in a colony they now called the Philippine Islands.

The second event is the marginalization of the indigenous Lumad and Moro communities of Mindanao starting with the American institutionalization of the ownership and disposition land through the imposition of the regalian doctrine and the torrens system. This means that the United States has become the owner of the new Philippine colony and reserves the right to pass laws to dispose of the land to its inhabitants. The US colonial government started the process by passing a law declaring as null and void all land grants made by traditional leaders if made without government consent.

At that point, 1903, no such traditional land grant had government consent. The legislative mill then churned out the public land laws and implemented the government resettlement program . Vast territories were opened for resettlement from north to south of the archipelago. This was how Filipino settlers from Luzon and the Visayas inundated Mindanao. In less than sixty years from the inauguration of the agricultural colonies in Cotabato in 1913 to 1970, the process displaced the Lumad and Moro communities from their traditional territories. And this was all legal, mostly at least, executed by government with government support.

Colonial government, and subsequently the Philippine government created the very conditions that marginalized the native Lumads and Moros in their own lands. The settlers who took part in the program unwittingly also contributed to this marginalization. So, now we have the Moro problem. And the Lumad problem. Threatened with extinction and aspiring to survive with dignity , both must now assert their right to self-determination within their respective ancestral domains.

The third event is the grant of independence to the Republic of the Philippines in July 1946. Filipino political leaders were responsible for the series of events that led to the Jones law in 1916, the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 and the Treaty of General Relations in 1946 which recognized the grant of independence. The 1935 Constitution defines Philippine national territory in Article I, Sec. 1, as follows:

“The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington between the United States and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.”

Notice that this constitution, as does the 1987 constitution, upholds the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris. Our sovereign republic is a direct product of colonial logic. The official line of the United States government was that there were no nations here (in the Philippine Islands), only different tribes fighting one another. But somewhere along the way, American officials made sure that the Sultan of Sulu waived his sovereign powers in favor of the United States of American. So, in the end, when it granted independence it was only to one Republic of the Philippines whose sovereign people are called Filipinos.

The Bangsamoro Struggle for self-determination

The Bangsamoro leaders’ political position challenges the very foundations of our present sovereign state. There is no question about this. And to defend national sovereignty and maintain the integrity of national territory, every government of the republic must uphold the constitution. And in any political negotiation it conducts with the MNLF or the MILF it is duty-bound to use the constitution as it guide and framework. But this is the very constitution that upholds the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris! This is the very constitution that upholds the primacy of colonial logic in the formation of our Philippine republic. This is the very same logic that led to the marginalization of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao. And now, is the government saying that we should use the same tool and the same colonial logic to correct the historical injustice perpetrated upon the Bangsamoro and the Lumad?

If we uphold the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris through our constitution, must we also de-legitimize the celebration of our national independence on June 12, 1898? If we do, this will in effect render meaningless President Diosdado Macapagal’s order to move celebration of independence from July 4 to June 12.

If we uphold the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris through our constitution, are we not in fact upholding colonial principles against democratic principles?

To solve the Bangsamoro problem, it seems that we have to make a number of major decisions. One, we have to complete the decolonization of the country and declare the Treaty of Paris as a colonial legacy that must go. Two, uphold the legitimacy of the Sultanates of Sulu, Sultanates of Maguindanao as de facto states in their own right at the time of the Treaty of Paris. Three, reorganize the Philippine republic on the basis of consent of the governed. Needless to say, we have to adopt a new constitution.

(Prof. Rudy Buhay Rodil was vice chair of the government peace panel that negotiated with the MILF until the MOA-AD of 2008. Previous to that, the Mindanao historian and history professor, an expert on Moro and Lumad histories, was a member of the GRP peace panel that negotiated and forged an agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) from 1992 to 1996. Before becoming a panel member, Mr. Rodil was a member of the Regional Consultative Commission that drafted the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao).

 
The MOA-AD is “dead”. This became the headline in newspapers when the Supreme Court (SC) declared the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) as unconstitutional last October 14, 2008. The “death” of the MOA-AD had divided and polarized the country like never before in recent history. 

The debate on the MOA awakened dormant religious prejudice and discrimination between Muslims and Christians. While the people who were Anti-MOA celebrated, some Moros felt that they had lost something. Some other Moro sectors felt like an “anti-dote” to the Moro problem was deliberately withheld from them. Disillusioned MILF rebels renewed hostilities with the government forces. Suddenly, the dreaded “ilagas” emerge and revived past Muslim-Christian community conflicts. There is so much blissful celebration and emotional retaliation by each side respectively, yet only a few really know the issues involved that was “killed” by the Supreme Court decision.  

In a sense it was a pyrrhic victory for it gave the impression that a negotiated peace settlement is unfeasible, further pushing those in the jungles of Mindanao to pursue their armed struggle as the only way of, paradoxically, achieving peace.  

With the escalating conflict in Central Mindanao which is displacing close to half a million civilians, it is important to understand the implication of the Supreme Court decision. The ruling must be viewed not as a wall that bars dialogue but rather as guidance to a better and peaceful settlement.  

Injustice: root cause of the Mindanao problem 

In order to understand the issue on the MOA-AD, it is important to have a working background of the Mindanao problem. It will be biased, however, if it is based on the perspective of a Moro. Thus, a re-statement of points made by Archbishop Orlando Quevedo (Archbishop Quevedo), the former two-term President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and current Sec. Gen. of the Asian Bishops’ Conference, during the 27th General Assembly of the Bishops’ Businessmen’s Conference in Taguig, Metro Manila, on July 8, 2008 entitled, “Injustic: root cause of the Mindanao problem,” shall be more credible. 

He argued that the roots of the problem in Mindanao are due to three injustices, namely, against: (1) The Moro identity; (2) The Moro sovereignty; and, (3) The Moro integral development.  

The injustices against the Moro identity were the centuries of effort to “subjugate, assimilate and integrate the Bangsamoro without regard to their historical and cultural make-up, which is an injustice to the Bangsamoros’ religious, cultural and political identity.”  

As to the second, Archbishop Quevedo considered “a fundamental injustice,” the loss of sovereignty of the Moro which it defended for three centuries, only to be gradually lost to the US and the Philippine government. 

Lastly, with regard to the injustices against the Moro integral development,  “with the loss of political sovereignty came the loss of great chunks of Moro ancestral lands by legal enactments” of the government during those times. “The loss of land was compounded by government neglect of the Moro right to integral development. In all dimensions of human development, political, economic, educational, and cultural, the Moro population continues to lag far behind its Christian Filipino counterparts.”  

As the quest for justice is the spirit of the MOA, its basic element is the clamor for equality between the majority Christian citizens and the minority Muslims in the Philippines – equality in terms of integral development. Is there equality when the Bangsamoro people live with human development index (HDI) equal to the poorest countries in Africa, like Congro and Ethiopia? The HDI what the United Nations use to collectively measure standard of living, education, health, security, access and opportunity. Where is equality when people in ARMM, in general, has a life expectancy 20 years lower than the people in the rest of the country? Can there be equality when a US-AID study recently showed that the english comprehension of a significant number of teachers in ARMM are equal to a grade 4 pupil in Manila? Is there equality when a Tabang Mindanao study in 2006 showed that more than 90% of the people in Basilan, Sulu & Tawi-Tawi do not have access to potable drinking water?  

Some will dismiss this by putting all the blame on the Moros. Yet, who has the political and economic control in this country that can allocate resources and can have the political will to address major challenges? Sadly, the only consistent resource regularly sent to ARMM  are bombs and bullets. 

Economics Nobel price winner Amartya Sen, in his book, “Development as Freedom” expanded the definition of development. From simply a measure of income he included human capabilities. He calls this the “substantive human freedom.” In essence, he said that a people whose capabilities are not harnessed and developed are not free. In other words, a person whose mind, faculties, talents, gifts and capabilities are not developed and utilised are trapped in a poverty worst than the lack of money.  

SMART CEO Manny Pangilinan during a Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) anniversary said that the ARMM is beset by the worst poverty of all, the “Poverty of Capacity.” Why? Because it constrains people to the point of being unable to even help themselves. A people who is blindfolded with ignorance and shackled with poverty are no worse than prisoners in a cell. If we really belong to one Nation, under one flag, why do we let more than four million people, who all belong to the minority Muslim ethnic groups, live as prisoners of ignorance, poverty and neglect? 

These perspectives have become the generally acceptable premise for grievances and sentiments that must be addressed by the present Administration and the Filipino people in general. This search for redress is, therefore, the spirit of the MOA-AD.  

Why the Supreme Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional 

If the quest for a solution to the injustices is the spirit of the MOA-AD, then that answer was not barred after all by the Supreme Court. Instead, what had only been declared unconstitutional was the means in arriving at such end as founded on five main grounds, to wit:  

(1) That no consultation was made on an issue that affects significantly a large territory and population;  

(2) That the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) had provided a clear procedure on how ancestral land may be granted to indigenous peoples and the Executive Branch does not have the power to unilaterally supersede a procedure mandated by law;  

(3) That it would have been a binding international agreement that would compel the Philippines to support the right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro people;  

(4) That the Executive Branch cannot guarantee that the Constitution will conform with the MOA; and, 

(5) The concept of “Associative” relationship is a “transition point to independence” which threatens the territorial integrity of the Country. 

1. Violation on the peoples right to information

Section 7 Article III of the Philippine Constitution recognizes ”the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.” The Local Government Code of 1991 further “require all national agencies to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units before any program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.” Yet, in this matter that is definitely of public concern, no consultation nor public information was made. Thus, the Supreme Court declared that the government negotiators abused their discretion by not informing and consulting the people most affected by the proposed policies, as mandated by law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did not forbid the Executive branch from proposing peace solutions. It merely slammed the deceptive secrecy in the drafting of the peace agreement.  

An overview of the petitions will show that the primary relief sought was the exclusion of their territory in the proposed BJE. It is evident, therefore, that the greatest fear of the MOA-AD oppositionists is to be under a proposed Bangsamoro government, whose present condition in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is far from encouraging. Statistics say that it has the highest poverty incidence, the lowest access to all government services, and the poorest governance indicators.  

Hence, this challenge must first be addressed prior to any contemplated expansion. ARMM should first be made the model region in the country not necessarily in economic prosperity but even just in the transformation from “governance of the guns” to good governance. The success of “internal self determination” must first be proved with an improved bureaucratic and service delivery system in ARMM before other people would realistically be expected to say “yes” to a plebiscite to be part of it. 

2. The IPRA has its own procedure that must be followed

The MOA-AD had envisaged “ancestral domain” to be given by virtue of an executive agreement. The Supreme Court declared it as unlawful since it is contrary to the procedure laid out by the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act.  The law requires a process of delineation, presentation of proof, investigation and approval of by the National Council of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and due notice. 

In spite of this, Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J. believes that an executive agreement is no longer necessary to grant the Moros their Ancestral Land as the IPRA law may suffice.  

Flashing back to a hundred years ago, the Americans, after purchasing the Philippine Islands were actually “shocked” by the “small dots” of territory that Spain controlled in Mindanao.  However, the government declared all lands without Torrence titles issued by the Spaniards as public lands. With almost all Moro land not registered with the Spaniards against whom they had fought for more than three centuries and to whom they did not surrender their sovereignty, almost all Moro lands in Mindanao were declared public property. Now, what are left to the Moros are the small islands of the Sulu archipelago, the outskirts of the Lanao Lake, and the volatile plains of Maguindanao.  

It is true. This past historical injustices that were allowed by the laws then could not be corrected by another injustice to the present generations who now occupy the lands. However, there are still thousands of hectares that remain as public property that may be given to the Moros thru the issuance of Ancestral Land titles. These may still be granted to correct a historical wrong.  

The Subanon tribe, with a national indigenous peoples survey estimating their population at 90,000, is currently processing an application for 15,000 hectares of Ancestral Land title in Zamboanga Peninsula. If they can forward a claim, then why can’t the more than 4.3 million Muslims in the Philippines apply and reclaim some of the Ancestral land “legacies” that Moro ancestors had defended and fought for three centuries?  

It is a popular belief by the public that the MOA-AD will grant Ancestral Land titles even if it is already under private ownership. This is not true. What the MILF wants to take back are those public lands that remain unused, unutilized, or at least uninhabited. Also, Ancestral land titles awarded by the IPRA cover lands that are State-owned and do not include areas already owned by private individuals. In fact, according to the NCIP, of the 15,000 applied for by the Subanon tribe, only 9,000 may actually be awarded since the rest are already of private ownership. It is clear then that the law ensures that land already owned by its citizens are protected. This may also give an insight that the individual tribes of the Moro must apply to the IPRA to avoid the confusion since the term Bangsamoro is defined differently by the ARMM organic act compared with the proposed MOA. This may also hasten the delineation between the Ancestral domain of different tribes considered under the term Bangsamoro. 

The Supreme Court noted further that there is a significant difference though with Ancestral Domain as proposed in the MOA and Ancestral Land as defined in the IPRA. The former involves more control over the resources found in the land while the later is simply a land title as evidence of ownership. Nonetheless, since the present law already grants Ancestral Land titles, the Moro indigenous people must not wait for another decade to apply. By the time another peace agreement is signed, all areas may have either been converted to private land or granted as Ancestral land to other indigenous groups. 

Basically, the Supreme Court did not declare that the Moros are not entitled to their Ancestral Land. The Court simply stated that there is a procedure that must be followed based on the existing law.  

3. It may have been a binding International obligation

Justice Adolfo Azcuna warned that the MOA-AD “would have provided a basis for a suit in an international court ”since the Philippines made a unilateral declaration before representatives of the international community.” Moreover, since international law is not limited by precedence, the MILF GRP MOA may have become a landmark case that would have compelled the Philippines to enforce the agreement. 

However, even without the MOA, there is now an international customary law that supports the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples. Last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The Philippine government was one of the 142 countries that signed the declaration. Article 3 of the declaration states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Furthermore Article 26 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” 

Along this line, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.” This makes the UN Declaration part of the laws of the Philippines. Furthermore, the doctrine of “pacta sunt servanda” in International law obliges the Philippines to “perform in good faith” such UN Declaration. This enjoins the country to continue searching for a remedy to the valid grievances of the Moros. Of course, democratic processes must be followed and proper consultations made, not only in the implementation, but to include the conceptualisation process. 

4. The Executive branch cannot guarantee the Constitution to conform with the MOA 

Justice Ruben Reyes said that the Executive Department went beyond its powers in unilaterally guaranteeing an amendment to the Constitution to conform with the MOA-AD. Such power, as Justice Antonio Carpio also contended, belongs to Congress and the People. On the other hand, Justice Minita Chico-Nazario deemed it within the powers of the Executive to offer solutions beyond what the present constitution allows when circumstances of ”internal conflict” justifies. Nonetheless, the majority of the SC Justices agreed that the Executive Department “gave a promise that it could not deliver.”  

The Supreme Court recognizes the power of amendment to the Constitution to reside with Congress and the people and not with the President. The Executive may recommend, but not guarantee, amendments. Thus, the peace process should change gear and direction and move towards the realization of the Federalism proposal. A charter change that will push for a federal-presidential government system with a regionalized senate will help the country decentralize political and economic power. Indirectly, this will move will give the Moro a more meaningful autonomy.  

Now is the time for a serious debate on this issue not only by the legislators, but by all stakeholders, especially the people. More importantly, the MNLF, MILF and other minority sectors who have issues should start preparing concrete proposals, conduct consultations and popularize their issues. At the end of the day, good ideas will just be thrown in the garbage bin if it does not get the acceptance of the leaders and general public.  

Only by long term comprehensive planning that engages all stakeholders can we truly arrive at a sustainable national roadmap. The case of the MOA may have been another product of disjointed planning where the left hand plans things that the right hand, and absurdly, even the “head”, does not know. Where else can you find a government that suddenly declares a MOA-AD as a solution then retracts a few weeks thereafter? Like a fickle, it suddenly reverses its statement. It announces that it will not sign it “in any form” and states that it will shift be changed to “community based consultation”, and, then, changes strategy yet again to a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rehabilitation (DDR) program. This clearly shows a lack of long term comprehensive agenda.  

Having three distinct plans with only a few weeks of intervals shows a total lack of deep understanding and political will to solve to address this national problem; but, the present administration should not totally be blamed. It is the system itself that makes political survival and post-administration security the number one priority of any president. 

5. The “Associative” relationship is a “transition to independence.”

The decision of the court stated “In international practice, the ‘associated state’ arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.”   

As regards to the transition aspect, the “associated” relationship was used by the British government as a transitional phase for its former colonies, most of whom were members of the short lived West Indies Federation. As colonies of the British Crown, they were inevitably on the way towards independence due to the process of decolonization after World War II. The British government themselves had the political will to grant independence. Almost all countries held as colonies by Western and European countries have ever since been granted independence.  

In the case of the Philippines, political will for the dismemberment of the country is an unimaginable option. The GRP and MILF negotiators may not have intended the “associative” relationship as a jumping board for independence. In law, the nature of contracts are not only defined by what they are called but more importantly by the elements present. Moreover, the basic characteristics present in the “associative” system are also present in the Senate Joint Resolution No. 10 as endorsed by 16 senators this year. In fact, the much feared power of being able to demand independence in an “associative” BJE is also present in the Federal proposal. The Senate proposal gives a State the right to secede upon approval of two thirds of Congress voting separately. Also, the “associative” power of having State police while external defense rests with the “central government” is also present in the proposed Federal system. So is more power given with regard to control of natural resource and having foreign economic ties. In essence actually, the BJE is an empowered version of the Bangsamoro State proposed by the Senate. 

While the Supreme Court has “killed” the proposed MOA by the Executive Department, the “spirit” of the MOA is still proposed by the Legislative Branch in the Federal system of government proposal. It is just waiting for its time to come. The Supreme Court had declared that only the Legislature and the people are endowed with the power to change the Constitution. It is beyond the power of the Executive to transgress. But then again, if the Country will have a new Charter after the 2010 elections, then the Supreme Court will have a new frame of reference in declaring unconstitutionality. What may be unconstitutional today, may not necessarily be unconstitutional a few years from now.  

The spirit of the MOA-AD lives on 

In summary, the spirit of the MOA survived. The Court merely required consultation, the proper IPRA procedures and restrained the President from giving promises it cannot keep. It also identified the Legislative and the people as the ones with the real power to give what the spirit of the MOA seeks. Therefore, the peace process should focus on being able to convince the legislative branch of government and the people to co-own aspects of the MOA that can lawfully be incorporated during the Charter Change.  

The Supreme Court decision can be viewed “as a light that shows the right way” instead of being perceived as the “executioner” of the peace process. With this decision, where does the path to peace go? The practical and feasible way is the Federal system of government proposal. Much of the points raised in the MOA can be accommodated in the Federal concept. The aspect on Ancestral domain, may at this point be pushed through the IPRA law.  

The urgent and important issue that must be addressed by the peace process, the proposed federal government or the present Administration is the problem of education in ARMM. Since education is the greatest equalizer amidst poverty, an “intensive-care” approach should be made in rehabilitating the educational system of ARMM. The government must elevate the principle of “Parens Patriae” to apply to the region and take responsibility over the deteriorating quality of education in ARMM which is debilitating the next Moro generations. 

According to Al Jazeera news channel, the father of President Barrack Hussein Obama was born and raised in one of the poorest communities in Africa, with no access to electricity and television. Since his grandmother and most of his relatives in Kenya are Muslims, he faced a double edged prejudice – first, as an African-American and second being associated to Muslims. Yet in spite of these negative stereotypes and being part of the minority, it was simply quality education that empowered the son of a poor African-American to become the most influential man on earth today. More amazing is that, it can happen in one generation. The fact that Obama got elected as President of the US shows that there is hope for change in this world. The spirit of change, emanating from the most powerful country in the world, may hopefully also spark the momentum of change in our Country. 

The aborted MOA signing should be taken as a positive change in the long history of war the Philippines. A recognized revolutionary armed group is willing have a paradigm shift to seriously believe in a negotiated agreement instead of an armed struggle. Although the GRP negotiators may be scolded for making gross mistakes, the MILF should still be given credit for believing in the democratic process. The burden of being within the bounds of the laws rested on the government and not with the MILF. Thus, the peace process should continue. But a real peace process must involve the government as a whole and its people.  

The fear of having part of the country secede, should be met with sincere effort to address the root causes that divide the country. Fear and military force should not be the iron chain that keeps this country together. It should be the universal love by the Country to all its citizens no matter what religion, ethnicity, and geographic location. The Moro people must be given a chance to be equal with his fellow Filipinos in all aspects:  in practice and not just in law – in reality and not just in the ideal sense. 

At the end of the day, the spirit of the MOA-AD will continue to find a way to be realized. The MOA proposal may have been stopped on its tracks by the Supreme Court, but the grievances and injustices that drove it still exist. Hence, as long as the spirit of the MOA-AD, which Archbishop Quevedo divided into three injustices, lives on and the gross inequality between the minority and majority remains, then there will always be a clamor for change and justice.  

The interconnected problems of wars, poverty and illiteracy are merely symptoms of deeper causes such as the aforementioned injustices. Only by addressing these injustices can we stop the vicious cycle of conflict that hampers development. While there are those who advocate justice by democratic means, most of them simply fall on deaf ears or are silenced. Consequently, only those who advocate with guns are heard. Thereafter, the government misinterprets this as purely a security problem which can only be resolved by “an all out war.” However, a military solution is only palliative in nature and will never address the issues raised nor solve the problem. If only the hundreds of billions of pesos spent on war is used to address the injustice to the Moro integral development, perhaps peace would be more within reach. 

Change and justice will never be achieved by having more blood spilled on the fertile lands of Mindanao, but by the ink of the pen on paper. In fact, Muslims are taught that “the ink of a scholar is holier than the blood of a martyr.” Undeniably, as the beginning of the injustice started with unjust laws and executive policies a century ago, justice can only be institutionalized by incorporating affirmative action into our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence.  

More than quarter of a million people have already died due to the Mindanao conflict in the last five decades. How many more people must die by the bullets and bombs for a cause that only a pen can resolve? 

—
Comments regarding this article may be emailed to donloong@yahoo.com 

[Engr. Don Mustapha Arbison Loong is the President of WMSU Law Students’ Association, the former Provincial Administrator of Sulu, a US State Dept. International Visitor Alumni, a British Chevening Fellow to Bradford University, UK, an AIM Bridging Leadership Fellow, a former delegate to the South East Asian Conflict Studies Network in Thailand, an Outwardbound Global Leader to the peak Mt. Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, Africa, and the President of the Movement for Economic Development in Sulu Foundation, Inc. He is also one of the founding co-convenors of the Young Moro Professionals Network]

When, at the dawn of the high-tech, ultra civilized 21st century, the Bangsamoro finds itself still bereft of its inherent rights and freedoms as a distinct sovereign nation, stolen as they were, under cover of “civilizing” democracy by successive colonizers; 

When, after many decades of so-called peace negotiations, the Bangsamoro people wakes up to the harsh truth of the abominable situation of sustained betrayal, manipulation, lying, cheating, and killing  by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

When, today, the Bangsamoro is subjected to another cruel war by a government that abdicated democratic government, declaring the Bangsamoro as its subjects for protection yet waging atrocious war against it, this time, right after the exposure of its base insincerity in consummating the previously agreed upon and approved Memorandum of Agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD), executed by and between the government of the republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF);

When, today, the Bangsamoro cannot find any redeeming justification for the non-existence of genocidal intent in the acts of the government of the republic of the Philippines in 1) taking side with the notorious Ilonggo land grabbers association (Ilaga) and other land usurpers, all of whom have amassed wealth in Bangsamoro territories without consent nor participation of the Bangsamoro, and some of whom also wrested control of local governance and would own the whole of Bangsamoro homeland by systematically dispossessing the Bangsamoro, and 2) unleashing disproportionately massive military forces with heavy land and air artillery for pursuing two commanders of the MILF yet indiscriminately bombing and destroying communities and villages and deliberately sowing fear and terror to the populace resulting to the  displacement of thousands and thousands of innocent civilians;

When, today, the acts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines include the incomparably contemptible authorization and distribution of 13,000 arms to civilians, many recipients of whom are

Ilaga adherents who desire above all to drive out the Moro people from their territories thereby exposing all pretensions to equal protection of its peoples by the GRP, as well as the scheme to instigate a genocidal civil war reminiscent of the dictator Marcos policy, to broad daylight;

When, today, despite the valiant resistance of Bangsamoro freedom fighters against an overwhelming war machinery and military operations of a colonial government and despite the perseverance of the great majority of the Bangsamoro to sustain and advance the struggle, the Bangsamoro civil society believes that the only remaining hope for immediate and just resolution of the conflict is in the existence of international organizations and entities sworn to maintain world peace and security by safeguarding human rights and peoples’ rights and the promotion of conflict resolution through principled, just and peaceful means;

And when, today, we, the Bangsamoro multi-sectoral members of the civil populace of Lanao resolve to adhere to the hope and trust that these humanitarian organizations, appraised of a gross crime against humanity in our region of  the world will come to the aid of the victims of this unjust war, the peace-loving Bangsamoro and Filipino civil populace,  alike;

With solemn prayers that this appeal finds its niche in the hearts and minds of all peace-loving citizens and organizations of the humane world, we therefore call on the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference to jointly intervene in this Mindanao conflict, to mediate for the cessation of the war and to institute the just resolution of the grievous injustices to the Bangsamoro and their right to self-determination;

We call on the United Nations to investigate and determine the true cause and extent of the war and if the principles and purposes for which the UN exists still operates, to disregard the GRP assertion of the war as an internal affair or that the current imposition of war on the Bangsamoro is legitimate and instead afford protection of all peace-loving Bangsamoro and Filipino civil populace from the scourge of unjust war and especially to uphold and protect the Bangsamoro right to self-determination as guaranteed under UN declaration and international laws.

Issued this 2nd day of October, 2008 during the multi-sectoral Bangsamoro civil populace rally for peace at the Plaza Cabili, Islamic City of Marawi.

Dear All,

We don’t have money to further enrich the national dailies with a whole page AD.  So I do have to settle for alternative media prints “a la pobre”.  But it has the benefit of global interconnectedness.  Here’s my initial salvo to Frank’s ADS on MOA-AD.  I will elaborate my commentary much later.  For the sake of a broader debate, please help circulate this Open Letter on the MOA-AD.

Yours truly,
Datu Michael O. Mastura

An Open Letter
24 August 2008

My reply email was interrupted by a brownout amidst my composing thoughts I wanted to convey to our readers at the Mindanews website besides Luwaran website.  Hopefully someone from the editorial box of the national dailies (in particular PDI) will pick as news items warranting some space the legal views of lawyers (like me) who represent MILF as the real Party in interest across the GRP-MILF negotiating table.

The series of full page ADS in PDI 08/22/08 and PD 08/23/08 of former senate president Frank M. Drilon simplify and focus on perceived infringements to the 1987 Constitution.  Those two Q & A pages make up powerful arguments for the continuing extension of what I call the “colonisibility status” of the Bangsamoro people, posing the matter of immediate infringement as a danger.

If we think rationally out of the maddening reactive anti-Moro sentiments generated by opinion-editorials and hardly balanced media coverage of the Government-MILF peace process, it makes me reflect the ‘triumph of diplomacy’ in our era of postmodern states. [N. B. this phrase is taken from the title of a book on how the Moro rulers of the Magindanaw sultanate and the Sulu sultanate had survived the era of treaty-making with Spain, an imperial power, and Holland, a commercial power, of the time and the United States up to 1916, when President Woodrow Wilson enunciated seminal ideas of the right to self determination.] Thus, there is no occasion to speak of Balkanization of this ungovernable part of the region.

Now the Country (el Pais)—Las Islas Filipinas—has just awakened to the depth of the Bangsamoro legitimate GRIEVANCES.  Instead of killing the ideas—the CAUSE (or SABAB)—embodied in the MOA-AD, the representatives of Government must face up to the Agreed Text as STATECRAFT.  It vindicates the JUSTNESS of the ORIGINAL POSITIONS to fix in constitutional construct. Traditional Moro negri (statehood) ‘earned sovereignty’ is encapsulated by the Republic in its present form and structure as an autonomous entity presently in existence before the family of nations since 1946.

Spokespersons for that Sovereign state called the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) configure their constituencies into a political community.  Such an assumption neglects a number of contested constitutional issues before the negotiating table.

What is the “territorial integrity” of the Philippines? When reduced to geographic maps with proper technical coordinates, the fundamental question we formally raised at the GRP-MILF Talks are as follows:

1. Is the present national territorial delimitation based on the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898 as corrected by the Treaty of Washington of 7 November 1900 and the treaty between the United States and England on 2 January 1930? Or,
2. Is it the current technical description of the archipelagic doctrine based on R.A. 3046 of 1961, as amended by R.A 5446 of 1968 as a system of straight baselines, its negotiating position on boundary delimitations under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention?

An act of statesmanship is to ‘write sovereignty’ in terms of the ‘associative ties’ envisaged in the MOA-AD.  We cannot proceed with a serious debate as if the meaning of sovereignty were stable; for, in reality, not one but various forms of sovereign statehood exist. There’s no confusing justice with legitimacy for workable arrangements here.  However, there’s a truncated understanding of sovereignty when 12 June 1898 was fixed by law as an episodic event, following the inauguration of Philippine independence on 4 July 1946. Article 1 of Title I of the Malolos Constitution succinctly reads: “The political association of all the Filipinos constitutes a nation, whose state is called the Philippine Republic”.  At that point in time, the Bangsamoro homeland was not a part of the whole Country, for as a matter of historical narrative that Republic invited the Sultan of Sulu and the Sultan of Magindanaw to federate with it.

What matters for us present generation of patriots is that Driion’s half-a-million-worth of PDI ADS highlights the absolute necessity for a change in the first principles of the unitary system. How do we, then, fit inter-subjective understandings of ‘statehood’?  Former senate president Drilon, at least, seriously confronts the arenas of debate over the MOA-AD, but why does he not concede to explore the course of constitutionalism beyond the status quo of the existing constitutional order? That is unfortunate, because, what is placed before the Supreme Court is a new “elegant formula” of negotiability to balance between state sovereign authority and the right to self determination.

We need to examine the MOA-AD on the foundation of the formal division of sovereignty that favors “state rights” that have inhered in the Bangsamoro people, whose ancestral homeland was “illegally and immorally annexed” to the Republic without their plebiscitary consent.  Peace negotiations are said to be “the war after the war”.  Here, too, there is a subtle but in-depth way of looking at what amount of central authority in point of fact is compatible with “what is worth dying for” in the eyes of the majority of Bangsamoros in the contemporary politics of identity.

This is what the MILF-GRP negotiation process is all about: to determine the extent and limits of each side’s commitments. Clearly the premise of peace with your Muslim brothers under the MOA-AD precisely does not endanger but entrench the Country’s sovereignty.  The MOA-AD achieves, rather than contemplates the use of naked coercive force, the desirable levers of division, allocation and distribution of powers; in other words, shared and residuary authorities for the Bangsamoro people and the rest of the Filipino people.  All I can advance for now as an explanatory note is that the “general welfare clause” of the Philippine Constitution matching the principle of maslaha wal mursalah in Islamic constitutionalism is a catch all framework to accommodate “a medley of associative ties and tiers”.

I will elaborate on these points in a separate commentary on specific provisions of the MOA on AD. If only a healthy environment for serious debate is not drowned out by the intrusion of the mass media into the negotiating process that now encourage the politics of fear at the Metro Manila capital while excessive use of force are applied to villages in Mindanao, we can peaceably settle the conflict in Mindanao.

All the best,
Datu Michael O. Mastura

Q. Are these recent clashes in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte an offshoot of the failure to sign the MOA-AD?

A. I cannot help but arrive at that conclusion. You know, there are only two ways to resolve the conflict: either through military means or through negotiations. And apparently, after the cancellation of the signing of the MOA, the product of a dozen years of long and hard bargaining on both sides, perhaps, there are armed groups who feel it will already be hard to resolve the conflict by way of negotiations.

Q. Do you think the government and military should have anticipated that this would be the backlash from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)?

A. I’m sure they’ve always been aware of the possibility of this happening. This situation is not new to them.

Q. Does it help the MILF if they undertake this kind of hostilities granted that they may have been frustrated?

A. I have to go back to the sentiments on the ground, both civil society as well as sentiments of people within the MILF as well as the other revolutionary movement, the MNLF. You have to bear in mind that the Mindanao peace process is three decades old. This started in 1976. The feeling on the ground is that, they had this 1976 Tripoli agreement, there was a 1996 peace agreement, but where did these end up? It ended up in failed implementation. When the MILF leadership undertook negotiations with the government, many in their ranks were already asking: why negotiate with the government when all the past peace agreements have never been implemented? So there’s always been skepticism among the [MILF] ranks in the peace process. And then at each stage of the peace process, each stage of the exploratory talks and formal talks, there has always been good results that both the MILF and government could present to their respective constituencies. But after all of those hard bargaining, those long years of negotiations, after they arrived at an agreement on how to resolve the conflict, suddenly, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was blocked. So the skepticism that was present before is alive again. I think that’s what we’re seeing now.

Q. Were you privy to the details of the MOA-AD that was to be signed in KL?

A. There were several instances when I had attended very public forums where members of the GRP [government of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as members of the MILF gave the audience updates on what was going on.

Q. What about the contents of the draft MOA-AD?

A. We were given updates on what were the pending issues they discussed, they had resolved. My friends in the Mindanao People’s Caucus, for instance, organized several of these forums in Davao City , in Marawi City , and these very public consultations. And I also recalled that every time that the GRP and the MILF panels are about to meet, they always announce, they make a public announcement that we are about to meet.

Q. I guess the people back then should have already known about the more contentious issues such as the resource sharing agreement with the GRP-MILF, the inclusion of 700 barangays in an expanded Bangsamoro homeland. All of these were made public.

A. Some of these were made public. The forums I attended, these were staggered. They occurred over time. So depending on what the status of the negotiations at that time, that was what was divulged.

Q. Sen. Mar Roxas and Frank Drilon actually have an initialed copy of the MOA-AD, and they’re taking exceptions to several provisions there. For example, that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity can now enter into separate treaties with foreign governments. And now, they’re saying that that’s totally unheard of for an autonomous homeland, to have that kind of sovereign power. Was that ever included in the consultations?

A. I think they refer not to treaties or all kinds of treaties. They referring to economic treaties, and this is not entirely unheard of. This is the kind of arrangement that they have in Belgium . For example, the Flemish region in Belgium is allowed to set up trade missions or enter into economic treaties with other countries.

Q. Like Quebec in Canada .

A. Yes, so let us bear in mind that the Philippines is not the only one that has an internal conflict in the whole world. So maybe we should learn at how this kind of problem has been tackled in other parts of the world. So I think that’s what the GRP and the MILF panels have borne in mind. And if I’m not mistaken, they’ve also mentioned Northern Ireland , for example, when it comes to a need to reexamine the Constitutional framework to resolve the conflict.

Q. It’s good you mentioned the Flemish territory in Belgium . But doesn’t it cause a lot of tension within Belgium ?

A. The tension that I’ve heard in Belgium is actually being managed by these sort of accommodations or arrangements. Because the Waloon region [of Belgium] can always tell the Flemish, why go for separation when you already enjoying these sovereign privileges? And I guess that’s what both the GRP and MILF panels had in mind when they agreed on this MOA-AD. I suppose what they were thinking was that, there would be no use, for now, to secede because all of these genuine…sort of tools would now be afforded or accorded to you rather than paper autonomy.

Q. But look at what’s happening now, when you see the MILF acting in a belligerent way, just because they’re frustrated, ,maybe this, to them, hopefully a hiccup in the peace talks, and then they finally give up all hope and resort to violence again. What does it say about giving a group like this the kind of powers that are contained in a MOA-AD? Isn’t it dangerous?

A. I will be frank with you. We ourselves are finding it hard to pacify these armed forces. We need to appeal for them to hold back, all the armed groups because, as they were saying, ‘We thought you said we should give negotiations a chance. We’ve been talking already for 12 years. We’ve already faced two all-out offensives already and then it ends up nowhere.’ We in civil society are finding it hard to pacify these armed groups. And I’m not just talking about the MILF, I’m also talking about the AFP. Our work is made much harder when we hear about much-publicized statements from our political leaders who say, if the MOA-AD is signed, there will be bloodshed, which we find completely illogical. Because what they’re saying is, if there’s a peace agreement, there won’t be peace. There will not be any peace. Whereas we are saying, if there’s a peace agreement, there will be peace.

Q. Let me play devil’s advocate. If you say it’s hard to pacify these groups, what we’ve seen is it’s the MILF that has been provoking these all-out wars. So it’s the MILF that is more difficult to restrain than the AFP.

A. I don’t want to take sides. I just want to say that when it comes to military solutions…we hear so many people say now, it’s time to go all out against the MILF. What I want to remind everyone is that every time we adopt a military solution, it never works. Remember that in the 1970s, we were under martial law, and President Marcos, with all the resources and powers he had in his hand, could not crush a hastily organized rebel army with very little training, with no battlefield experience, with very minimal equipment. And the military went against them during martial law. Here we are, three decades later, they are far more experienced, they have more equipment, what makes us think that they cannot put up a fight? What I’m afraid of is, they fought for two weeks in North Cotabato , we already have 160,000 internally-displaced refugees, extrapolate then. Let’s assume they continue fighting for two or three months. How many thousands or millions of refugees will we have? Remember, in year 2000, we had one million internally-displaced people, and these were World Bank and government figures.  In comparison, Bosnia only had 600,000, East Timor only had 300,000. What I’m trying to say is, if we do not deescalate the situation, we might end up becoming the Darfur [in Sudan] of southeast Asia.

Q. Right now, we have a Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). So far, we haven’t heard from it. If that committee does its job, then it should defuse the situation.

A. I remember one instance when I talked to a member of the CCCH. This was about Cotabato. This was when a Civilian Volunteer Organization and the MILF were fighting. The MILF were farmers in that area; the CVO members were also farmers in the barangay. There was fighting and it was reported to the Joint Ceasefire Committee. The committee came in and it was told by the CVOs, “We don’t recognize any captain. We don’t recognize any ceasefire committee.” So, the problem is, the public in Manila who don’t know any better, who are not immersed on the ground, who don’t know what’s happening, it’s very easy for them to be manipulated. It’s very easy for public opinion to be manipulated nowadays. Because we know that in times of war, the first casualty is truth. I would advise our friends in media to get a direct line to the CCCH so we will know what’s really happening. Let’s not rely…our sources of information should not depend on groups that are taking advantage of the conflict. We have so many groups who feel that their interests, whether economic or political, will be affected negatively by the peace process. I’ve always said the reason why there’s still no signing of a peace agreement is that….I’ve always said that if the government panel, as well as the MILF panel were left on their own to decide if they should sign the agreement, they would have done that two years ago. They just couldn’t sign it because they’re afraid. There are powerful economic and political forces who genuinely feel that their interests, political and economic may be adversely affected by the Mindanao peace process. Because we are talking here of returning the ancestral domain of the Moros themselves. Now, let’s ask ourselves: who are enjoying now the fruits of these ancestral domain? Who owns the mineral rights? Who has tens of thousands of hectares per DENR records in Mindanao ? How would you think they feel, now that the government is about to return the ancestral domain back to the Moros?

Q. But were they consulted in the first place?

A. If they had been consulted, what do you think they would say? Our friends in Zamboanga are complaining, they’re saying they were not consulted. But later, they said, they were. And they’ve said no. Apparently, what they mean by consultation is, to them, they are consulted if the government takes their position. In layman’s term, when we ask, what do you think? It doesn’t necessarily mean that I would have to adopt your position. But to them, they say that since they have already expressed their views in a public forum, albeit informally, their position is, the government should adopt their position. The problem is, if you’re in the GRP or MILF panel, if you try to accommodate everyone’s interest into this agreement, without asking anyone to make sacrifices or compromises, we will never arrive at any peace agreement. And what we saw today, it will continue to grow.

Q. How can this be resolved? The President has already ordered an all-out offensive. The military says it’s not going to stop because it’s already got the upper hand. Even local officials say it’s got to stop now. When do you think it’s going to stop?

A. I myself am hoping everything dies down, everbody calms down. How is it going to stop? There has to be…we have to show to everyone that there is a big constituency for peace. As of now, what’s being given air space and print space are the anti-MOA and the MILF. And both of them are either saying, if there’s no MOA, there’s going to be war. Or if there’s MOA, there’s going to be war. Right? Perhaps, it’s about time, the silent majority, if there is really a silent majority in support of the peace process, or the peaceful resolution of the conflict, maybe now is the time, now more than ever is the time for us to come out and say to everyone, say to these groups, say to those who would rather resolve the conflict by armed means, ‘Wait, there’s a big constituency in support of a peaceful resolution of whatever grievances, Bangsamoro grievances you have there.’

Sometime in 2006, if memory serves me right, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita told a group of foreign diplomats and media men that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) finds it difficult to deal with the ‘Moro rebels’ because they are splintered into so many factions. Ermita was alluding to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as well as to the various factions of the latter.

The point that Ermita was trying to impress upon his audience was that the negotiation between the MILF and the GRP, which was going through a rough time at that particular moment, is quite impossible to conclude because the GRP does not know whom to deal with. That is why, he averred, the Moro Fronts have to unite first and put their acts together before the GRP can ink a final deal with the MILF. This is not, however the first time that Ermita raised this issue.

Apparently, Ermita at that time was looking for a good pretext to justify the GRP’s foot-dragging over the matter of concluding an agreement on Ancestral Domain with the MILF. This foot-dragging had caused the impasse in December 2006 as well as all the subsequent snags in the peace negotiation in 2007 and 2008.

But as recent events show, what Ermita was trying to project proves to be the other way around: the problem does not lie with the Moro liberation movement. The problem of  uncertainty  in concluding an agreement, especially on ancestral domain, that would usher in the end of the conflict in Mindanao is with the GRP.

For about four years since 2004, the MILF and the GRP were locked in critical negotiations over ancestral domain, which is the third and last aspect in the MILF-GRP Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 2001. The MILF and GRP panels could not put closure to this Agreement until the Ancestral Domain is resolved and translated into a sub-agreement form. Once translated into sub-agreement form, i.e. the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), the negotiation can now proceed to its last phase which is the table discussion on, and crafting of, the Comprehensive Political Compact which will embody the final formula designed for resolving the conflict in Mindanao.

Unfortunately, when the MOA-AD, which was earlier initialed by the chairs of the MILF and GRP panels, was set to be signed formally in an elaborate ceremony hosted by the Malaysian Government the Philippine Supreme Court acted on the petition of Filipino politicians headed by the colon vice-governor of North Cotabato, Emmanuel Piñol, by issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to stop the GRP Panel from signing the MOA-AD. The TRO was issued on August 4, the eve of the signing ceremony at Putrajaya, the administrative capital of Malaysia. The result was what the MILF calls a faux pas, a ‘political and diplomatic’ blunder, that caused great embarrassment for the GRP because its last minute withdrawal from the ceremony made it appear like a fool before the representatives of the international community who were there to attend the would-be historic event.

There is however, a more a serious implication to this than just the faux pas in Kuala Lumpur. The whole debacle brings to fore the issue that Ermita raised on several occasions when he asked whom shall the GRP negotiate with in the face of the factionalism within the Moro liberation movement. But this time, it is the MILF that should ask the same question: With whom shall the MILF negotiate – the Arroyo regime, Congress, Supreme Court, the Church, the Big Business power blocs, the AFP or Piñol and the Filipino colons in Mindanao?

Former General Rodolfo Garcia, GRP chief negotiator, practically begged for this question when he stated to the media that in the event the Supreme Court rules against the legality of the MOA-AD, the GRP Negotiating Panel will have to renegotiate the Ancestral Domain issue with the MILF. After more than three months of ‘due diligence’ – three months that it took the legal experts commissioned by the GRP to study the constitutionality and legality of the draft MOA-AD – now the GRP Negotiating Panel Chair is telling us that the same issue which took four years to settle on the negotiating table has to be renegotiated.

What happened to the “due diligence” of the legal experts of the GRP?

Who are we going to negotiate with this time, the Supreme Court?

Who, indeed?

Why not Piñol and Celso Lobregat who seem to be more powerful than the GRP or the Philippine Republic?

If one has to listen to the griping against the MOA-AD and give validity to the claims of those Filipino sectors that say that they are the stakeholders in Mindanao but were not consulted, it is as if it is the Bangsamoro people who have no right to assert their own claim to their ancestral domain. The Filipinos have forgotten that the Moro homeland has been occupied and owned by the Moros since time immemorial and for which they have sacrificed many lives down the centuries to preserve and defend from aliens, including the Filipino colons, who covet it.

The question posed above, now primordial in view of the debacle in Kuala Lumpur, is what Ermita et al should answer.

Except for the politically senile Nur Misuari, the still potent factions of the MNLF are one with the MILF behind the Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain issue. Brother Muslimin Sema, the current mayor of Cotabato City and recently elected chair of the MNLF Central Committee, was there in Putrajaya; and so was Brother Jikiri, former MNLF-Bangsamoro Army Chief of Staff and now a member of the Philippine Congress, among others. Other MNLF leaders would have been there if it were not of the relatively heavy financial requirement for travel.

Moro civil society groups were also there in full force, including the representative of a once secret Moro revolutionary society in the late 60s whose members became the core of the first batch of young Moro foreign-trained guerilla cadres that formed what was to become the MNLF. They all came to witness a very historic, nay, a highly emotional event that was the near culmination of the long and hard revolutionary struggle of the Bangsamoro people. Every Moro who went to Putrajaya to witness the signing took part in it one way or the other.

But what is most interesting and highly significant is that the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was present in the person of its representative, Dr. Sayed Al Masry, Adviser to the OIC Secretary General and Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Southern Philippines. According to Dr. Al Masry, his presence at Putrajaya is not only to witness the signing but to endorse the MOA-AD for and in behalf of the OIC.

It has to be noted that in the past the OIC had been hesitant to recognize any peace agreement other that those between the MNLF and GRP. This change of mind indicates that the OIC has now realized the reality on the ground in Mindanao that it is currently the MILF that is on the driver seat of the peace negotiation with the GRP. That the MILF has gained more than what was accomplished by the MNLF on the negotiating table is a realization that finally dawned on the OIC.

What do all of these presences signify? These signify the important fact that the MILF has done its homework of uniting behind the MOA-AD the domestic and international forces needed to be harnessed to give it legitimate recognition and legitimacy. In contrast, the GRP, alas, has dismally failed even to get the support of its own officials or, to be more precise, the other two major branches of government – the legislative and the judiciary. Worse, it even failed to draw support from its constituency, the Filipino public.

That said, the aborted signing in Kuala Lumpur reopened the proverbial can of worms. For one, it exposed the internal weaknesses of the GRP, particularly the inutility of the sitting regime. Having been forced to cancel the act of affixing its signature on a document that it had already initialed earlier, the GRP is cast in a situation whereby its capability to conclude peace agreements with the MILF, not to mention the MNLF and the National Democratic Front (NDF),  is now open to doubt. And this does not augur well for the peace process in Mindanao because elements within the Moro liberation movement who oppose negotiations with the GRP seem to have been proven right.

Indeed, why negotiate with a weak and inutile government that cannot exercise authority over its own people let alone deliver on its commitments in the agreements it signed with other parties?

This can of worms has also regurgitated another unsavory reality that has been with us ever since our forefathers fought the Spaniards and their Indio factotums: the anti-Moro attitude of the Filipinos.

We are aghast at the way Filipino politicians, whether in and out of government, and with the help of the media, have whipped up an anti-Moro, anti-Muslim hysteria that has swept the whole country. It is simply nauseating to see and hear on radio and TV these politicians blatantly and publicly distort the MOA-AD and turn it into propaganda to demonize the MILF, the Bangsamoro people and Islam. It is sickening to note that they are playing on the ignorance of the Filipino public to drum up opposition to an agreement that would be the key to resolving a long-drawn conflict that has confined both the Bangsamoro and Filipino peoples in the political, economic and social quagmire.

The MILF-GRP agreements, and notably the MOA-AD, never talk of Moro independence. Yet, with the way it is being presented to the public by these politicians and the media it is as if the MOA-AD were already a declaration of independence by the MILF and the Bangsamoro people.

In an endless mantra that is already irritating to the ear, the Philippine constitution is said to have been violated by the MOA-AD. No consultation, they also aver, has been made by both the GRP and MILF panels regarding it.

Clearly, the Filipino politicians and their paid media hacks who peddle this lie either do not know the root cause of the Mindanao conflict or they are simply driven by their greed and colonialist impulses not to allow any measure of justice to be accorded to the Moros.

Whatever it is, the simple but ugly truth that now stares us in the face is: the Filipinos hate the Moros so much that they would never allow the latter to be free or even be given a semblance of self-rule.

The debacle in Kuala Lumpur and its aftermath – the reemergence of the anti-Moro, anti-Muslim sentiment in view of the MOA-AD – made this clear to all of us, including the international community.

But let us look at their arguments.

They say that there was no consultation on the matter of ancestral domain. This is a prevarication. The MILF held numerous consultation meetings with the Moro public on this. In May 2004, before panel discussion on ancestral domain commenced, a mammoth gathering was held in Camp Darapanan which was attended by more than 3 million Moros from all walks of life and from all parts of the Bangsamoro homeland. Consultation is one of the cornerstones of MILF policy-formulation. The MILF leadership had informed the representatives of the various sectors of the Bangsamoro people of the then forthcoming negotiation on ancestral domain. Subsequently, the MILF leadership received the mandate to negotiate for and in behalf of the Bangsamoro. This mandate was extended by the MILF leadership to the MILF Negotiating Panel.

If there are sectors of Moro society that were not consulted, it is because of extraordinary circumstances pertaining to security and/or the rule on confidentiality in the peace talks which the MILF, GRP and the Malaysian facilitators have all agreed on. But by and large, all sectors of Moro society were informed and appraised of the centrality of Ancestral Domain to the resolution of the conflict in Mindanao.

The Filipinos have no right whatsoever to accuse us of failing to consult our public. They should remember that the Bangsamoro people were not consulted when they were incorporated into the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 and subsequently into the Philippine Republic in 1946.

During martial law, when Cotabato was gerrymandered and divided into smaller provinces of which the larger and richer ones were given to the Filipino colons, there never was any democratic exercise to consult the Moros on the parceling of their home province. The division of Cotabato was made while war was being waged against the Bangsamoro people by the Marcos dictatorship. Yet after the dictatorship was booted out of power in 1986, there was no attempt to rectify this anomalous gerrymandering of Moro territories by the new regime in Manila which claimed to have restored democracy and justice.

It has always been the rule under the Philippine colonial regime that when it comes to the partition of Moro lands, only the Filipinos have the right to do that, not the Moros. Even an institution like the so-called Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which has been set up for the purpose of perpetuating the charade of political autonomy for the Moros does not have that right. Look at what happened to the now-defunct province of Sharif Kabungsuan. The Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA) of the ARMM created a new province out of the existing province of Maguindanao (albeit to serve the political interest of a Moro warlord close to the regime in Manila) but this was later nullified by the Philippine Supreme Court which ruled that it is not within the competence of the RLA to create a new province. What does this tell us? Only the Filipinos who dominate Congress can create provinces from Moro territories as they see fit. This should put an end to the myth of “Muslim autonomy”.

Which bring us then to the question of the Constitution.

The Mindanao Problem predates all of the Philippine constitutions – from the 1935 constitution to the 1987. It even predates the establishment of the Philippine Republic in 1946. In other words, the solution to the conflict in Mindanao can never be solved by and within the Philippine constitution. Any Filipino bright boy who says so is deceiving himself and the Filipino public. Why? It is because the conflict in Mindanao is colonial in nature; it is rooted in the historic usurpation of the sovereignty and freedom of the Bangsamoro people which the Spanish colonialists failed to achieve but which the Americans succeeded in partly accomplishing and which they passed on to the Filipinos as a colonial legacy. Nonetheless, though the Moros were forced to come under Filipino colonial rule at the point of American bayonets, they never gave up on their aspiration to regain their freedom and the restoration of their homeland. That is why all the way from American colonial rule to Philippine colonial rule, there was almost an unbroken chain of Moro armed resistance. This armed resistance is what the negotiation between the MILF and the GRP is trying to address and resolve peacefully “out of the box”, meaning outside the constrictive parameters of the Philippine constitution.

Is this possible and legitimate? Yes. The wholesale injustice committed on the Bangsamoro people should make this possible and legitimate as well as moral. Contemporary paradigms in resolving sovereignty-based conflicts around the globe, such as the Mindanao problem, are geared at the outset toward addressing the root cause of these conflicts before constitutional issues are brought up to accommodate the political formulas agreed on at the negotiating table. In short, in resolving these conflicts the constitutions of the states involved were never taken as obstruction in the way of crafting political formulas that would end these conflicts to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. This happened in resolving the sovereignty-based conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Sudan, Bougainville, etc. Shared sovereignty, as a modality for addressing the sensitive issue of state sovereignty versus the right of self-determination of a captive nation, has found its way into the constitutions of established nation-states. And the states which accomplished this were not only able to resolve a debilitating problem but move forward to political stability and economic progress.

Cognizant of this fact, at the beginning of their negotiations in 1997 and again in 2001, the MILF and the GRP came into a compromise: the issue of independence will not be raised by the MILF and the GRP will not invoke the Philippine constitution as framework for formulating the negotiated political settlement of the conflict. With this mutual understanding, the parties proceeded with the incremental peace negotiation that took almost 11 years to reach the present stage that it is in now.

But even with this arrangement, the MILF, in all its dealings with the GRP in or out of the negotiating table, never required the latter to violate its own constitution. Never. The record of the minutes of the meetings that took place since the negotiation began in earnest in Kuala Lumpur in 2001 should attest to this. What the MILF demanded from the GRP is that it should fulfill its commitments in the agreements. If fulfilling the agreements requires amending the Philippine constitution to accommodate these agreements, the MILF posed no objection because this is an endeavor that is internal to the GRP and its constituency. What matters most to the MILF is the GRP’s commitment and sincerity to fulfill its end of the bargain. As to whether this would entail constitutional changes or not is never the concern of the MILF.

What the Filipino politicians – and the Filipino public for that matter -  failed to comprehend is that the MILF is not bound to a constitution that it does not recognize. The MILF is a revolutionary organization, not a political party that operates within the ambit of the constitution. Furthermore, the MILF is not the MNLF, which ultimately recognized and accepted the supremacy of the Philippine constitution over the agreements it forged with the GRP.

The MILF cannot make the same mistakes that would lead to the failure of any agreement with GRP as what befell the agreements between the MNLF and the GRP. This is basically the reason why the MILF rejected the Philippine Constitution as the framework for negotiations with the GRP. On the other hand, it does not prevent the GRP from taking ‘legal’ measures and processes to accommodate in the Constitution the agreements signed on the negotiating table.

This is clearly reflected in the MOA-AD where it mentions the holding of a plebiscite in areas that are to be included in the territory of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) outside of the present ARMM areas and the six Moro-dominated municipalities in Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM. If the MILF was inconsiderate of the dilemma that the GRP would be facing in delivering these Moro areas to the BJE, it would not have consented to a plebiscite, which is a constitutional process. In fact, those who vociferously cry out that the MOA-AD has not gone through the process of consultation ignore the provision on plebiscite which is stipulated in the document. What better popular consultation can one have than a plebiscite?

And to those who are falling for the lie that we Moros are forcing the indigenous peoples (IPs) to join the BJE, better look at the MOA-AD again. There you will find among its provisions the declaration that the IPs  have been given the free choice – repeat, free choice – to join or not to join the BJE. And talking of IPs, we Moros are the indigenous people of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Even before our forefathers embraced Islam and became nations under the Muslim sultanates, we occupied and lived in the lands that the Filipinos now claim as their ‘territory’ under their constitution.

The political opposition to the MOA-AD that spurred the nationwide reaction against the MILF and the Bangsamoro people has dangerously transformed a peace process that is supposed to bring reconciliation to two peoples at war with each other into a grim scenario that allows no space for the Moros to have a breathing spell.

Through the MNLF, the Moros asked for a meaningful political autonomy in 1976. Instead they were granted a fake one by the GRP under the Marcos regime using the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which allowed constitutional processes to shortchange the Moros. In 1996, the Moros again under the MNLF demanded for meaningful political autonomy; and again what they were given in the so-called MNLF-GRP Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was the ARMM, which was created before the FPA and whose autonomy was clipped by the Philippine constitution. Inevitably, the ARMM ended up reduced to merely being an extension of the Office of the Philippine President. Later, it was even taken out of MNLF hands and became a political prize awarded to the Moro warlord most loyal and subservient to the sitting regime.

Now, under the MILF, the Moros want to recover whatever little is left of their ancestral domain and be given the chance to govern themselves as a sub-state entity within the larger Philippine nation-state. Peace on the basis of justice is about to be achieved under this formula. But even this does not sit well with the Filipino elite, the politicians, the Church and the Filipino colons in Mindanao. They have sabotaged the efforts of their own government. All, including those who claimed to be sympathetic to the plight of the Bangsamoro people like Senator Aquilino ‘Nene’ Pimentel, Jr., have ganged up against the Bangsamoro people to prevent them from even reclaiming areas which  they now actually occupy and where they are the majority. The result: back to square one. Mindanao again is on the edge of an all-out war.

The selfishness of the Filipino ruling elite in general and the Filipino politicians in particular is dumbfounding. Their lack of sense of justice is appalling. They and their drumbeaters in the Philippine media can lie through their teeth and still have a nice sleep at night. Imagine telling the public the fantastic spin that Malaysia is arming the MILF and the Americans are behind the Moros’ desire to be an “independent Islamic State”. Why, they can’t even make sense of their allegations and lies!  You can never find any mention of an “independent Islamic state” in the MOA-AD even if the pages were turned upside down. To even say that the Americans are behind the attempt by the MILF to create a “Bangsamoro Islamic State” is absurd.  What fantasy! What ignorance! Hollywood hogwash has taken grip of the Filipino mind that it no longer knows what is real and what is imaginary. No wonder why the Philippine nation-state is moribund. No wonder why tens of thousands of Filipinos are leaving this country for good. Now I can better appreciate the context of what Ustadz Salamat Hashim, the late MILF Amir, said when he stated that we should not believe the Filipino unbelievers even when they say that the crow is black!

What needs to be stated here for the record is that we Moros are not inclined to abandon our homeland to these vultures. We will fight for it as our ancestors fought for it. The mestizo leftovers of the Spaniards such as the likes of Teddy Locsin and Lobregat, and Filipino colons in Mindanao like Piñol as well as their capitalist patrons ensconced in Makati can go hang themselves from nearest lamp post for all we care. The Moros will fight. MILF Base Commander Ustadz Amirul Ombra Cato will not be alone. A war in Mindanao will drag down this pathetic, artificial country and its government to perdition. Perhaps this time we will no longer settle for a sub-state or a federative arrangement with the Filipinos. It’s useless anyway because they would never grant it. They would always insist this is ‘secession’ even if we do not have the intention to secede. So let’s give them a dose of their own medicine. Let’s aim for independence this time. For real.  Like what the Algerians did when their clamor for autonomous rule was repeatedly and violently denied by the French colons. Given the Filipinos’ hostile attitude to anything Moro and Muslim, there is no other option left. This is now the reality facing us.

-End-