Last March 10, 2010, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Nur Misuari faction, held its 4th Bangsamoro People’s National Parliament (BPNP) in Lanao del Sur. I understand Prof. Nur Misuari was there himself. The BNP came out with a curious resolution, among others, that needs to be reacted upon.

Among the resolution is a warning – repeat, warning – to Malaysia not to block the implementation of the GRP-MNLF 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA). We find this curious, not to say outrageous, because we don’t see the relevance of this particular resolution which points an accusatory finger at Malaysia on the presupposition that the latter is blocking the FPA.

Our brothers in the MNLF, most of whom are, or became, Philippine government officials or employees are barking at the wrong tree. Is this “warning”, which is an open display of arrogance, an oblique reference to Malaysia’s facilitation of the MILF-GRP peace negotiations? The nuance seems to indicate so. Regardless of the reason, Malaysia, which is a member-state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), has never blocked the implementation of the MNLF-GRP 1996 FPA.

To call a spade a spade, if there is an entity that is responsible for the non-implementation of the FPA, it is the Philippine government (even the OIC now realizes this); and if there is an obstacle to it, it is the FPA itself that provides that obstacle! This infirmity in the FPA is very clear that even a high school student who reads English will not fail to notice it if he were to go through it thoroughly. Why did our brothers in the MNLF accept this infirmity? They themselves signed this document!

Come to think of it, brothers and sisters, how can you even urge the UN to recognize the right of self-determination of the Bangsamoro people when you, yourselves, recognized, acknowledged and accepted without question in the FPA the supremacy of the Philippine constitution and all “existing laws” over you? The Philippine government can easily demolish your arguments before any international body using the FPA as a ‘weapon’ against you.

Unless you abrogate, nullify and void the FPA your legitimacy as “sole spokesman and representative” of the Bangsamoro people holds no water. It’s mere rhetoric that doesn’t mean anything.

Let me quote the ‘Totality Clause’ of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement: “This Peace Agreement, which is the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, embodies and constitutes the totality of all agreements, covenant and understandings between the GRP and the MNLF respecting all the subject matters embodied herein. This Agreement supersedes and modifies all agreements, consensus, covenants, documents and communications….Any conflict in the interpretation of this Agreement shall be resolved in the light of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws.” (underscoring mine)
With this ‘Totality Clause’, the MNLF has provided the Philippine government with all the excuses, pretexts and reasons for obstructing the implementation of the FPA on the basis of the Philippine constitution and “existing laws”. So who’s to blame? Malaysia? Come on! Grow up, my brothers and sisters in the MNLF! You’ve been had at the negotiating table. Admit it.

I hate to say this (and it bleeds our hearts even to think of it) but you’ve been defeated politically by the adversary.

But you also personally benefited from this defeat by accepting plum positions in government, foremost of whom is MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari who became regional governor of ARMM and is now running for governor of Sulu for the second time in the May 10 Philippine elections. Now that many of you are out of power, or about to be out of power, you’re whimpering like small children deprived of their goodies. Stop these childish acts and unite with your brethren in the MILF instead of issuing resolutions with ridiculous ‘warnings’ which people never even give a hoot about. For once, think revolutionary and act revolutionary! We are all brothers and sisters in Islam, brothers and sisters in the struggle for our people’s right to self-determination, and sons and daughters of the Moro Malay nation. Let not the fitna of our adversary come between us.

Again and again, the MILF has stated that it is not negotiating with the Philippine government solely for the MILF but on behalf of the entire Bangsamoro people. These include us, you and me, and all those brothers and sisters who may or may not even be supportive of the MILF.

Brother Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and the entire leadership of the MILF stand on the firm ideological and political position that we have to struggle together as a nation – one Moro nation – regardless of organizational affiliation, ethno-linguistic identity or class status. ‘Unity in struggle and struggle for unity’ is the call of the time.

Can you not see that?

Let us, therefore, do away with these foolishness and stupidity, stop blaming those who have helped us and are helping us rise from this dire condition we are in today because of colonialism.

Contemplate on this: seriously and objectively.

-end-

It is widely believed that economic growth and development have bypassed the southern regions of the Philippines. This is seen as the cause of the serious political problems that now plague Mindanao. A closer look at Mindanao’s economic development, however, reveals that far from being isolated from the mainstream of the national economy, the island has been a major performer and a primary contributor to the country’s productive capacities.

Lured by vast reserves of natural resources, business concerns have invested capital and technology and established ventures that have generated enormous profits for their owners and executives. But the resulting wealth and incomes have not benefited the greater majority of its people. Poverty and other social indicators point to a more distressed condition for Mindanao residents than for the nation as a whole.

This paradox of high growth rates and the simultaneous existence of an impoverished population have challenged scholars and development planners for many years. In the Mindanao case, this enigma is exacerbated by the effects of internal colonialism – the transfer of wealth from the southern regions to the nucleus of economic and political power in the north.

Demography

Mindanao, together with the Sulu Archipelago, occupies a land area of 10.2 million hectares or one-third of the country’s area of 30 million hectares. The historian B.R. Rodil’s classifies Mindanao’s population of 18.13 million as of 2000 into two major categories – the indigenous peoples and the migrant settlers. The indigenous population can be further classified into three groups. The first are the Islamized peoples (a.k.a. Moros) who number 3.63 million or 20 percent.

The second indigenous category is composed of the Lumad population who number 907,000 persons (6 percent). Some of these are the Manobo, Bagobo, B’laan, Higaunon, Mamanwa, Mansaka, Manuvu, Subanen, T’boli, and Teduray peoples. The third indigenous category number around 900,000 (5 percent) and is composed of the Visayan-speaking Christianized population of Northern and Eastern Mindanao and the Chavacano speakers of Zamboanga and Basilan who were already in Mindanao when the Spanish arrived in the 17th century.

Approximately 70 percent of the Mindanao population is composed of settlers who arrived in the 20th century from Luzon and the Visayas as part of government resettlement programs. Predominantly Christian, they also include the Chinese settlers and those belonging to the third indigenous category. Together with the third indigenous category, this group constitutes about 13.6 million people (75 percent).

There are, at the moment, six politico-administrative regions: Region IX (Zamboanga Peninsula), Region X (Northern Mindanao), Region XI (Davao Region), Region XII (SoCCSKSarGen), Caraga Region, and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). A total of twenty-eight (28) provinces and nine (9) chartered cities belong to the six Mindanao regions.

Mindanao’s Contribution to the National Economy

Mindanao’s large productive base enables it to contribute significantly to the country’s economic growth. Its forest area comprises 41 percent of the country’s vegetative cover and 56 percent of Philippine commercial forest land. It produces 73 percent of the national value added in the forestry sector. Fifty-six percent of total Philippine commercial forest land is in Mindanao. More than half of timber licenses issued in the country are granted for Mindanao operations. Mindanao wood products such as plywood, veneer, and lumber comprise over 90 percent of the country’s total production. Mindanao’s exports accounts for 70 percent of logs, 52 percent of lumber, over 90 percent of plywood, and 92 percent of veneer.

Its agricultural area of 3.73 million hectares comprises 38 percent of the country’s total farm area. The island produces 43 percent of the Philippines’ agricultural output. Overall, Mindanao supplies 40 percent of the country’s food requirements and 30 percent of the national food trade.1

Commercial and export crops are planted in about 51 percent of farm area and includes coconut, tobacco, rubber, sugar, export bananas, palm oil, coffee, abaca, and fruits. Commercialized agriculture has been on the rise with its land utilization and growth exceeding that of food crops.

The waters around Mindanao and Sulu contribute 32 percent of the country’s total fishery products and more than half of the country’s total commercial fish catch. Tuna fishing has become the country’s number one fishery sector with major export markets in Japan and the US. Thirteen Mindanao fishing firms based in the cities of General Santos and Zamboanga export about 80 percent of the country’s tuna.

The Philippines is the world’s leading producer of coconut and coconut products and more than half of the country’s coconut area is in Mindanao. More than 60 percent of Philippine copra and coconut oil exports come from Mindanao. Most of the country’s coconut oil mills are based in Mindanao. Agriculture, fishery and forestry production in Mindanao combine for 36 percent of value added for these three sectors of the country.

Rubber plantations in the Philippines are exclusive to Mindanao with some 60,000 hectares in planted area. Sugarlands in Mindanao total 56,000 hectares with three large sugar mills in Bukidnon, North Cotabato and Davao del Sur. The Bukidnon-based BUSCO has an ultra-modern mill funded by the Japan Import-Export Bank. Mindanao is also the main producer for coffee (75 percent) and for one-third of the country’s livestock products.

In the minerals sector, Mindanao’s share of the national total is about 25 percent. Gold, copper, nickel, chromite and coal are the major mining products of Mindanao as well as silver, zinc, and lead. The world’s largest nickel reserves are in northeastern and southern Mindanao. In February 2010, Sumitomo Metal Mining Company announced plans to invest $2.11 billion over three years to expand its nickel operations in Surigao del Norte.2 Gold and copper are extensively mined in the Agusan and Davao provinces. Five companies in Mindanao produce Portland cement including the country’s biggest and modern cement manufacturer, Bacnotan Consolidated Industries in Davao City.

Mindanao accounts for one-fourth of the country’s total export receipts. Its coconut products account for 43 percent of the country’s coconut exports, while wood products corner 60 percent of the national total. The country’s export fruits industry is composed almost entirely of bananas and pineapples. One hundred percent of these exports, comprising 90 percent of Philippine fruit exports come from Mindanao.

In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), however, Mindanao’s contribution appears less significant. In 2003, the island’s GDP of P192 billion was only 18 percent of the national total. The same year, Luzon’s share was 66 percent. Northern Mindanao had the highest GDP share of 27.1 percent of Mindanao’s total. The Davao Region was next with 25.4 percent while Soccskargen was in third with 20.1 percent. The Zamboanga region was fourth with 14.8 percent, Caraga fifth with 7.6 percent while ARMM was last with only 5.2 percent.

Mindanao’s growth rate, though less than the national rate and behind that of Luzon, is not that far behind. Between 1990 and 2000, Mindanao grew by 22.7 percent compared to the national rate of 24.4 percent. Between 1995 and 2000, Mindanao’s average GDP growth rate of 3.69 percent was only slightly less than the national average rate of 3.76 percent and of Luzon’s 3.97 percent. From 2003 to 2007, Mindanao’s average growth rate rose to 5.02 percent, with the 2007 growth rate alone standing at 6.91 percent.

Despite lagging behind the rest of the country based on several economic indicators, Mindanao enjoyed a positive trade balance in 2003 of US$707 million compared to the country’s negative trade balance of US$1.7 billion. Despite this overall positive note, interregional disparities still characterize Mindanao trading patterns with the Davao and the Soccskargen regions having the highest surpuses. In 2007, Mindanao exports totaled $2.6 billion while imports amounted to $1.2 billion, or a trade surplus of $1.44 billion.

Capital Formation

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lists a total of 3,954 corporations in Mindanao who registered between 2002 and 2008 with a total paid-up capital of P2.81 billion. Measured against the national figures, Mindanao’s new firms was only 3.46 percent of the Philippines’ total and 2.61 percent of paid-up capital.

The Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCO) announced that, in 2008, 40 investment projects valued P13.7 billion were registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). This constituted a 72 percent growth from the 2007 figure. MEDCO further reported that local investments almost doubled in value from P6.124 billion in 2007 to P12.004 billion in 2008 or a 96 percent increase. This surpassed the record set in 1998 of P9.5 billion.

Foreign Investments

According to the MEDCO, direct foreign investments registered for 2008 in Mindanao had a total value of P1.704 billion. Sixty-percent of these were Japanese investments in power generation sector, marine and petroleum products. Canadians were second with 21 percent mainly in the mining business. The British and South Koreans shared 4 each and were engaged in the export of Cavendish banana, petroleum products and coco peat/coco fiber business.

Foreign and foreign-affiliated firms (FFCs) in Mindanao operate in 21 categories of product and industry lines. The wood products industry had the most number of participating FFC firms, with 16; followed by manufacturing with 13; fishing and fish products, 12; banana production, 9; mining, 7; and coconut products, coffee, and cacao (cocoa) with 6 firms each.3

In terms of regional and provincial distribution, the FFCs operate in 119 locations in Mindanao. Many firms are present in several provinces and even several towns in one province. The Davao region is the major host of FFC operations with 50 locations (42 percent) followed by Northern Mindanao with 30 locations (25 percent) while the Zamboanga region has 28 (24 percent).

Infrastructure Development

In her 2009 State of the Nation Report, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced the completion of several major infrastructure projects in Mindanao including the P2.1 billion 882-meter Diosdado Macapagal Bridge in Butuan City, the 210 MW Clean Coal-Fired Power Plant, the 1-megawatt Solar Power Plant in Cagayan de Oro City, the P572.87-million Cagayan de Oro Port and the P420.22-million Davao Port.

Airport projects include the P700-million Butuan Airport Upgrading Project; the P600-million Cotabato Airport Rehabilitation Project; the P478-million Dipolog Airport Improvement Project and the P215-million Ozamis Airport Development Project; the P545-million Pagadian Airport Development Project; and the P423.50-million Zamboanga Airport Improvement Project have already been completed.

A major undertaking is the Cotabato-Agusan River Basin Development Project (CARBDP) which was implemented from 1975 to 2000 with an initial cost of P15.7 billion covered 11 provinces or one-third of Mindanao’s land area. It was funded mainly by foreign loans from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and Japan. The project budget has since ballooned such that for 1998 and 1999 alone, total allotments for the project reached P173 billion. Total project assets reached P331 billion by 1999. The Lower Agusan Development Project is the newest component of the CARBDP and consists of two phases with a total project cost of P2.18 billion.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US mainland, Mindanao has been given increased attention by foreign donors under the assumption that the Moro separatist movement is somehow linked to a global Islamic militant movement. This is not to say that donors did not pay attention to Mindanao in the past. The World Bank had, in 1998, committed US$10 million for the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) Social Fund Project following the signing of a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has, since 1996, also provided grants under various programs in Mindanao that, as of 2006, totaled US$292 million. Following the post 9/11 pattern, USAID assistance almost tripled after 2001 from US$90.6 million in 1996-2001 to US$242 million in 2002-2006.

As of September 2006, there were 21 active ODA loan projects in Mindanao totaling US$917.75 million. Ten of these were Japan-funded projects, with loan amounts amounting to US$473.04 million, or 52 percent of the total for the area. All these projects, plus the grants program of USAID are ostensibly meant to advance the peace building process in Mindanao. Japan had earlier launched in December 2002, a “Support Package for Peace and Security in Mindanao.”

In April 2003, President Macapagal-Arroyo launched what has been dubbed a “Mini-Marshall Plan” called “Mindanao Natin” worth P5.5 billion in government funds and US$1.3 billion in ODA funds for the next three to five years. The program targeted 5,000 Muslim villages in Mindanao’s regions, but the figures as of December 2006 show that not all of the announced projects got off the ground. For example, the World Bank’s commitment of US$279 million for four projects was eventually pared down to one project worth only US$34 million.

Aside from the “Mindanao Natin” initiative, a multi-donor Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP) has been established with the World Bank as the lead donor and Secretariat Coordinator. Other donors are the European Commission, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, and UNDP. Also known as the Peace Fund, MTF-RDP identified the rehabilitation needs of MILF combatants, MILF communities and indigenous peoples (IPs) estimated to cost US$400 million.

Development Strategies

Mindanao development strategies are driven essentially by the Philippine state’s objective of integrating the southern economy into the national mainstream. The focus is on large-scale infrastructure development to attract investments in export-led and market-driven growth industries. The aim is to open up more of Mindanao’s natural resources to exploitation and extraction with the private sector as the prime mover. Scarce attention, however, is paid to the actual needs of Mindanao’s peoples such as directly addressing poverty and inequality which are the principal causes of social unrest and rebellion.

During Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian rule (1972-1986), such strategies were formulated in the midst of increasing social tensions, the depletion of the land frontier, land concentration and agrarian conflicts, and the marginalization and impoverishment especially of the Moro and Lumad peoples. Post-Marcos development strategies did not differ essentially from the previous regime. Whether these be Corazon Aquino’s regional industrial centers, Fidel Ramos’ Mindanao Investment Development Authority (MIDA) and Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (Bimp-Eaga), or Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s “Mindanao National Initiatives” (Mindanao Natin), the basic premises, principles, and thrusts have remained unchanged.

In 2006, President Macapagal-Arroyo launched what she called the Super Regional Development Strategy, which is meant to “harness the common competitive advantages of a cluster of regions and provinces.” The country was then divided into five Super Regions with “Agribusiness Mindanao” being one of them. As the name implies, Mindanao is to focus on agribusiness as its “competitive edge,” particularly in the cultivation of “high value crops.”

In January 2010, Congress passed a bill creating a Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) which seeks to accelerate growth and development by putting in place a central planning agency for Southern Philippines. MinDA is to replace and strengthen MedCo and provide the strategic direction for Mindanao by formulating an integrated regional development framework.4

Echoing Macapagal-Arroyo’s initiative, MinDA would focus on agribusiness as a major area for economic development. It is doubtful, however, whether Mindanao’s hope lies in agribusiness, which, at the moment, already occupies a central place in the island’s economy. Agribusiness activities have caused more problems than solutions for Mindanao’s people, through environmental degradation, human rights violations, corruption, health problems, and wealth transfers.

Human Development Pitfalls

Despite the decades-long economic growth thrusts in Mindanao and apart from the economic disparities engendered by the unequal economic relations within the island and between Mindanao and the rest of the country, basic human development indicators reveal that economic growth has not benefited Mindanao’s peoples.

Using the human development index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Mindanao provinces fared badly compared to other Philippine provinces. Mindanao’s average HDI was only 0.635 in 2003, or 15 percent lower than the national HDI of 0.747. Seventeen out of 24 Mindanao provinces were in the bottom half of the national list. Worse, nine of the bottom ten provinces were all located in Mindanao. No Mindanao province placed in the upper fifteen percent. The bottom four provinces were all from Muslim-dominated provinces.

In the per capita income category, Mindanao had an average of only US$1,546 which is a mere 41 percent of the national per capita income of US$2,609. Furthermore, eight Mindanao provinces occupy the last eight places among the 77 provinces of the country and twelve of the last 14 places. Four of the twelve lowly-ranked provinces are Muslim dominated and are part of the ARMM. The highest nationally ranked Mindanao provinces, South Cotabato at 17th with US$2,223, Davao del Sur at 18th with US$2,158, Camiguin at 20th with US$2,110, and Misamis Oriental at 25th with US$2,045 all still had per capita incomes that were lower than the national average.

Poverty incidence in Mindanao is consistent with the island’s low standing in the national human development index. Its average poverty incidence of 42.4 percent in 2003 was 40 percent higher than the national average of 25.7 percent. Four Mindanao provinces, however, had poverty incidences lower than the national average of 25.7 percent: South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Davao del Sur, and Davao del Norte. On the other hand, six Mindanao provinces had exceedingly high poverty incidences, greater than 50 percent: Sulu (88.8%), Tawi Tawi (69.9%), Basilan (65.6%), Zamboanga del Norte (63.2%), Maguindanao (55.8%), and Siquijor (51.9%). Another seven provinces had poverty rates of between 40 percent and 47 percent in 2003.

Between 2000 and 2003, thirteen Mindanao provinces experienced a deterioration in their poverty situation. Large increases in poverty were registered for Maguindanao (by 19.6%), Surigao del Sur (by 14.4%), Davao Oriental (by 13.4%), Zamboanga del Norte (by 11.3%), and Surigao del Norte (by 8.2%). Nationwide, five Mindanao provinces were cited as among the ten top losers in poverty reduction incidence between 2000 and 2003: Maguindanao, Surigao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, and Surigao del Norte.

Inequality measures for Mindanao reflect wide disparities in income distribution and consumption patterns among its population. Its 2003 average Gini index of 40.8, however, although better than the Philippines national index of 43.9, represented a decline from the 2000 index of 36.4 points. On a province-by-province assessment, 21 out of 24 Mindanao provinces suffered declines in their inequality measures between 2000 and 2003.

Another measure of poverty is the subsistence incidence or the capacity to satisfy food requirements. For the country as a whole, 13.8 percent of the population was living below the subsistence food threshold and was thus unable to meet their food requirements in 2003. For Mindanao, however, all its regions registered lower capacities than the national average. The Zamboanga and Caraga regions had the worst record as the two landed at the bottom of the list of 17 Philippine regions with 32.8 (17th) and 31.8 (16th) respectively. Taking all six Mindanao regions, the subsistence incidence was 24.88, or 11.1 points higher than the national figure. This is an ironic situation given Mindanao’s reputation as the Philippines’ food basket, supplying 40 percent of the country’s food requirements and 30 percent of the national food trade.

Development Issues

Massive infrastructure projects in Mindanao generate social costs. Large-scale irrigation projects cause small farmers to lose substantial areas of their already small holdings. Site selection takes place often without the participation of the affected population and, sometimes, the selected sites are wrongly identified as uninhabited lands.

Furthermore, tribal communities lose their ancestral lands and their cultural heritage. More often than not, compensation for the loss of lands is not given. But how does one compensate for the loss of cultural heritage? Disruptions of cultural and religious practices by hydroelectric projects have been denounced by Islamic communities around Lake Lanao.

Large-scale projects entail high construction and maintenance costs. And it has been shown that small irrigation systems and scaled-down hydroelectric units can do the job just as well with lower costs and less social displacements. Large irrigation projects are also major pollutants since several irrigation systems discharge their return flows to only one major river, thus depriving families living on river banks of safe water supply. In addition, huge dams cause reduced soil fertility.

The major industries in Mindanao are of the extractive type which exploit and deplete natural resources. The rate of depletion of forests and fishing grounds is alarming and unfortunate because these are, after all, renewable resources. On the other hand, industries dependent on non-renewable riches such as minerals pose long-term risks for their dependent workforce, once total depletion occurs. In the tuna fish sector, lack of supply sometimes forces canneries to import fish.

Dislocation and displacement has often accompanied the entry and expansion of corporate operations in Mindanao. Scores of tribal Filipinos and settler communities have also been dislocated by logging operations in northern and southern Mindanao. The expansion of pineapple production by Del Monte in Bukidnon has pushed local communities off their lands. Also in Bukidnon, ancestral lands belonging to Manobo communities have been grabbed by cattle ranchers who then sold the lands to the Bukidnon Sugar Corporation.

The extensive monocropping patterns of agribusiness corporations dependent on high levels of chemical applications cause depletion of soil nutrients. In the case of the banana and pineapple industries, it is feared that once their operations cease, the badly damaged soil would not be able to sustain any other crop for many years. The cultivation patterns of pineapple plantations erode the soil, adversely affecting neighboring farmlands.

Depletion of resources without adequate replenishment measures ultimately damages the environment. Periodic flooding in logged-over areas in Northern Mindanao causes deaths and render thousands homeless. Extensive use of chemicals in farms disturbs the ecological balance in the area. Pineapple plantations encroach into watershed areas “causing substantial damage due to floods,” and small farmers complain about “the massive land destruction caused by floods from plantation areas during the rainy season.” Northern Mindanao’s coastal industrial belt, which includes cement factories, chemical plants, mineral processing factories and coconut processing plants, has been a major source of pollution.

Extensive use of agricultural chemicals by agribusiness operations also poses health hazards. Banana workers are endangered by exposure to harmful chemicals as plantation owners often do not institute health and safety measures, and doctors and nurses at these farms are not trained in occupational safety methods. There are thousands of victims of pesticide poisoning in the plantations. Aerial spraying of pesticides by banana companies has become a major issue in the area.

Most industries in Mindanao are export-oriented, dependent on the vagaries of international trade over which local producers have no control as the products they export are of low value added and do not fetch premium prices. Price instability and uncertainty thus affect Mindanao products such as coconuts, wood products, bananas, pineapples, minerals and fish. In the pursuit of the volatile export market, local needs are sacrificed. In the case of the fishing industry, the growth of an export sector has raised the prices of fish in the local market and put it beyond the reach of poor families.

Despite the expansion of economic activities in Mindanao, the southern economy has remained largely underdeveloped with features characteristic of a dependent type of capitalism. The emphasis on exports and TNC dominance has stunted local initiatives for developing an economic base with a higher level and quality of processing and manufacturing.

Processing activities have not gone beyond preliminary manufacturing stages and center on export-oriented goods. The wood industry, one of the oldest sectors, remains dependent on the intermediate processing of logs and lumber into plywood and veneer. Import dependence also characterizes a large number of these industries. The export fruit sector depends on the import of expensive chemical inputs to maintain high production levels. The Kawasaki sintered-ore plant imports almost all of its raw materials of iron ore and coke. The exceptions are agricultural and fish processing but being food products, their net value added is relatively low. The economic underdevelopment of Mindanao would explain its low share of the country’s gross domestic product.

Wealth Transfers and Internal Colonialism

There is no doubt that large amounts of wealth have been created from Mindanao’s abundant resources. Where all this wealth goes can be traced to the pattern of income distribution among different social classes and regions in Mindanao, the uneven development of the country’s regions and the relations of dependency between countries of different states of development.

In the first place, in Mindanao’s industries, the owners of the means of production capture a disproportionately larger share of the surplus than the workers while granting the latter less than a living wage. Second, within Mindanao itself, the more affluent regions, i.e., Davao and Northern Mindanao, take in a greater share of the income. Thirdly, the Mindanao regions are being drained of incomes by more developed northern regions. Fourthly, on the international plane, and as a result of the dominant role of transnational corporations in virtually every aspect of the various industries in Mindanao, wealth and resource transfers also occur in the direction of the developed economies of the world.

Internal colonialism theory describes and analyzes “the distribution of power and advantage within states” between a center and a periphery …where economic resources and power are concentrated at the center, to the advantage of which the periphery is subordinated.”5

This situation is clearly evident in the Mindanao case. The data show how large volumes of copra from Mindanao farms are shipped to Cebu and Manila and fish products caught in Mindanao waters are unloaded in Manila and Iloilo ports. Corporations operating in Mindanao usually have their main offices in Metro Manila, where they pay their taxes, thus depriving local governments of revenue. Internal colonialism would explain why, despite the presence of massive government projects and highly profitable industries, the Mindanao regions remain poor and deprived.

Conclusion

Mindanao has been the object of relentless economic exploitation since the turn of the 20th century. This process has produced immeasurable wealth and riches for a few mostly non-Mindanaoan firms and individuals. But it has also generated poverty and social marginalization for its working population, whether Moro, Lumad, or working class Christian settlers. Furthermore, its natural resources are being depleted at an uncontrollable pace stoking fears of an ecological backlash.

In the meantime, the Manila government is bent on accelerating the same age-old patterns of inequitable growth that have long deprived Mindanaoans of their just share of the economic surplus. The country’s leaders must initiate a process of constructing a new development paradigm for Mindanao that will finally render social and economic justice for Mindanao’s peoples. The grim alternative will be the continuation of the cycle of violence and warfare that have long characterized the southern Philippines.

__________

The author is a professor of Asian Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman.

This essay is based on a presentation made at the UP Academic Congress, Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines Diliman, 2 February 2010. It is an essay version of a paper revised and updated from two previous studies by the author: “The Political Economy of Mindanao: An Overview” in Mark Turner, et al (eds), Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise(Quezon City: New Day Publishers) 1992 and “Mindanao Briefing Paper” (2007) a research report submitted to the Consuelo Foundation. For the updated data, the research assistance of Sascha Gallardo is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-2010, p. 34.

2 Riza T. Olchondra, “Sumitomo to invest $2.1B in Surigao mine project,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 February 2010, p. B5.

3 The data on TNCs in Mindanao are based on studies conducted in the 1980s and need to be updated for changes that have taken place, particularly in the plantations which have since been placed under the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The general picture, however, remains valid.

4 Bernard Allauigan, “New Mindanao development body gains ground,” Business World, 19 January 2010 and Tina Arceo-Dumlao, “Fulfilling the promise of growth in Mindanao,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 January 2010.

5 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (London, 1975). See also David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in South-East Asia (Routledge, 1994) pp. 158-205.

I will not add to the remarkable details and lucid insights assembled in the analysis of my mentor, Mr. Pat Diaz. What I will do is to view the problem from another angle.

In the first place I ask the question. Is it the Moro problem we are trying to solve? Or the GRP problem?

If it is the Moro problem, it has been with us since 1968, almost 42 two years to date.

A series of major Moro organizations articulated Moro aspirations. The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) said it wanted to put up an Islamic State in predominantly Muslim areas of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan (Minsupala). President Ferdinand Marcos responded by appointing its leader, former Cotabato Governor Datu Udtog Matalam, as presidential adviser on Muslim affairs. The organization died but the seed had been sown.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) emerged immediately after and loudly proclaimed the birth of the Bangsamoro, and their intent to liberate the Bangsamoro from the clutches of Philippine colonialism and establish a Bangsamoro Republic in Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan, their ancestral homeland. The war netted more than 100,000 lives and cost the government more than seventy billion pesos in combat expenses alone. The GRP-MNLF peace negotiations that followed produced the Tripoli Agreement which established the Autonomous Region for the Muslims of Southern Philippines. It took 20 years before the two parties could agree on how to implement. Finally in 1996, they signed the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, but 13 years have passed and the government has yet to fully implement its provisions. And the government admits it.

Perceiving that the Bangsamoro cause has been compromised, the MILF refused to accept the 1996 agreement and announced its resumption of the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination. From January 1997 to the present, two big events were happening at the same, an active war in 13 provinces of Mindanao-Sulu Archipelago and a peace negotiation. Over the years the MILF has narrowed down its pursuit to the creation of a political entity somewhere in between the present autonomy and independence and very much an integral part of the Republic of the Philippines.

So, if I may reiterate, what is the GRP problem?

Since the time of President Marcos, from the first negotiating panel to the 18th, yes, Chairman Rafael Seguis is the 18th panel chair on the government side, the GRP position has been consistent: to uphold national sovereignty and the integrity of the Philippine territory; it agreed to negotiate but only within the framework of the Philippine constitution. The constitutional part became more specific in Article X of the 1987 Constitution. But the Moro problem remains unsolved.

This was why the Tripoli Agreement was acceptable to the GRP. It is new in Philippine political history, has 16 paragraphs and paragraph 16 says that the entire agreement was to be implemented in accordance with constitutional processes. It took 20 years for the two parties to agree on what that exactly means. But despite the 1996 accord, the GRP seems hesitant to fully implement it.

Thoughtful military officers who have fought in the Moro front since they were junior officers claim that the military has fought for 40 years; between 100,000 to 120,000 lives have perished, 50 percent were MNLF, 30 percent were AFP, and 20 percent were civilians; Php 73 billion have been spent in combat expenses alone. But the Moro problem is still there very much alive and kicking. It is obvious to them the war is not the answer.

In the negotiation front, the constitution is the main GRP framework for solution. The GRP is on its 18th peace panel chair and the same framework has been used. This is perfectly understandable. Every government employee as a matter of fact must swear to uphold the constitution as soon as he or she joins government service. How much more peace panel members who represent the republic through the office of the President. Still the Moro problem remains. Can we also say the constitutional solution is faulty?

It might help clarify a number of things if we review a series of interrelated events in Mindanao history.

The first event is the Treaty of Paris. Every Bangsamoro peace panel, whether MNLF or MILF, claims that they have never been colonized by the Spaniards but the Spaniards included them in their cession of the Philippines to the United States without their plebiscitary consent.

As a Mindanao historian who has done more than my share of historical research I know this to be true. As an assertion of our Filipino point of view, I should add that at the time of the Treaty of Paris, December 1898, it is doubtful if there was any part of the Philippines that Spain owned and could cede to the United States because the Filipino revolutionary leaders had declared Philippine independence in June of the same year.

The Cordillera was one territory she never colonized; the same may be said of Lumad communities which retained their independence through avoidance of contact with the Spanish forces. So, it is not only the Bangsamoro who should complain that they were never asked whether or not they wished their territory to be part of the Philippines; the Filipinos, too, and the Cordillerans and the Lumad – colonizers do not ask colonial victims for their consent. All this, of course, becomes moot and academic because we lost in the war against the Americans. As a consequence, we all became colonial subjects of America, in a colony they now called the Philippine Islands.

The second event is the marginalization of the indigenous Lumad and Moro communities of Mindanao starting with the American institutionalization of the ownership and disposition land through the imposition of the regalian doctrine and the torrens system. This means that the United States has become the owner of the new Philippine colony and reserves the right to pass laws to dispose of the land to its inhabitants. The US colonial government started the process by passing a law declaring as null and void all land grants made by traditional leaders if made without government consent.

At that point, 1903, no such traditional land grant had government consent. The legislative mill then churned out the public land laws and implemented the government resettlement program . Vast territories were opened for resettlement from north to south of the archipelago. This was how Filipino settlers from Luzon and the Visayas inundated Mindanao. In less than sixty years from the inauguration of the agricultural colonies in Cotabato in 1913 to 1970, the process displaced the Lumad and Moro communities from their traditional territories. And this was all legal, mostly at least, executed by government with government support.

Colonial government, and subsequently the Philippine government created the very conditions that marginalized the native Lumads and Moros in their own lands. The settlers who took part in the program unwittingly also contributed to this marginalization. So, now we have the Moro problem. And the Lumad problem. Threatened with extinction and aspiring to survive with dignity , both must now assert their right to self-determination within their respective ancestral domains.

The third event is the grant of independence to the Republic of the Philippines in July 1946. Filipino political leaders were responsible for the series of events that led to the Jones law in 1916, the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 and the Treaty of General Relations in 1946 which recognized the grant of independence. The 1935 Constitution defines Philippine national territory in Article I, Sec. 1, as follows:

“The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington between the United States and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.”

Notice that this constitution, as does the 1987 constitution, upholds the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris. Our sovereign republic is a direct product of colonial logic. The official line of the United States government was that there were no nations here (in the Philippine Islands), only different tribes fighting one another. But somewhere along the way, American officials made sure that the Sultan of Sulu waived his sovereign powers in favor of the United States of American. So, in the end, when it granted independence it was only to one Republic of the Philippines whose sovereign people are called Filipinos.

The Bangsamoro Struggle for self-determination

The Bangsamoro leaders’ political position challenges the very foundations of our present sovereign state. There is no question about this. And to defend national sovereignty and maintain the integrity of national territory, every government of the republic must uphold the constitution. And in any political negotiation it conducts with the MNLF or the MILF it is duty-bound to use the constitution as it guide and framework. But this is the very constitution that upholds the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris! This is the very constitution that upholds the primacy of colonial logic in the formation of our Philippine republic. This is the very same logic that led to the marginalization of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao. And now, is the government saying that we should use the same tool and the same colonial logic to correct the historical injustice perpetrated upon the Bangsamoro and the Lumad?

If we uphold the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris through our constitution, must we also de-legitimize the celebration of our national independence on June 12, 1898? If we do, this will in effect render meaningless President Diosdado Macapagal’s order to move celebration of independence from July 4 to June 12.

If we uphold the legitimacy of the Treaty of Paris through our constitution, are we not in fact upholding colonial principles against democratic principles?

To solve the Bangsamoro problem, it seems that we have to make a number of major decisions. One, we have to complete the decolonization of the country and declare the Treaty of Paris as a colonial legacy that must go. Two, uphold the legitimacy of the Sultanates of Sulu, Sultanates of Maguindanao as de facto states in their own right at the time of the Treaty of Paris. Three, reorganize the Philippine republic on the basis of consent of the governed. Needless to say, we have to adopt a new constitution.

(Prof. Rudy Buhay Rodil was vice chair of the government peace panel that negotiated with the MILF until the MOA-AD of 2008. Previous to that, the Mindanao historian and history professor, an expert on Moro and Lumad histories, was a member of the GRP peace panel that negotiated and forged an agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) from 1992 to 1996. Before becoming a panel member, Mr. Rodil was a member of the Regional Consultative Commission that drafted the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao).

Q. Are these recent clashes in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte an offshoot of the failure to sign the MOA-AD?

A. I cannot help but arrive at that conclusion. You know, there are only two ways to resolve the conflict: either through military means or through negotiations. And apparently, after the cancellation of the signing of the MOA, the product of a dozen years of long and hard bargaining on both sides, perhaps, there are armed groups who feel it will already be hard to resolve the conflict by way of negotiations.

Q. Do you think the government and military should have anticipated that this would be the backlash from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)?

A. I’m sure they’ve always been aware of the possibility of this happening. This situation is not new to them.

Q. Does it help the MILF if they undertake this kind of hostilities granted that they may have been frustrated?

A. I have to go back to the sentiments on the ground, both civil society as well as sentiments of people within the MILF as well as the other revolutionary movement, the MNLF. You have to bear in mind that the Mindanao peace process is three decades old. This started in 1976. The feeling on the ground is that, they had this 1976 Tripoli agreement, there was a 1996 peace agreement, but where did these end up? It ended up in failed implementation. When the MILF leadership undertook negotiations with the government, many in their ranks were already asking: why negotiate with the government when all the past peace agreements have never been implemented? So there’s always been skepticism among the [MILF] ranks in the peace process. And then at each stage of the peace process, each stage of the exploratory talks and formal talks, there has always been good results that both the MILF and government could present to their respective constituencies. But after all of those hard bargaining, those long years of negotiations, after they arrived at an agreement on how to resolve the conflict, suddenly, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was blocked. So the skepticism that was present before is alive again. I think that’s what we’re seeing now.

Q. Were you privy to the details of the MOA-AD that was to be signed in KL?

A. There were several instances when I had attended very public forums where members of the GRP [government of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as members of the MILF gave the audience updates on what was going on.

Q. What about the contents of the draft MOA-AD?

A. We were given updates on what were the pending issues they discussed, they had resolved. My friends in the Mindanao People’s Caucus, for instance, organized several of these forums in Davao City , in Marawi City , and these very public consultations. And I also recalled that every time that the GRP and the MILF panels are about to meet, they always announce, they make a public announcement that we are about to meet.

Q. I guess the people back then should have already known about the more contentious issues such as the resource sharing agreement with the GRP-MILF, the inclusion of 700 barangays in an expanded Bangsamoro homeland. All of these were made public.

A. Some of these were made public. The forums I attended, these were staggered. They occurred over time. So depending on what the status of the negotiations at that time, that was what was divulged.

Q. Sen. Mar Roxas and Frank Drilon actually have an initialed copy of the MOA-AD, and they’re taking exceptions to several provisions there. For example, that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity can now enter into separate treaties with foreign governments. And now, they’re saying that that’s totally unheard of for an autonomous homeland, to have that kind of sovereign power. Was that ever included in the consultations?

A. I think they refer not to treaties or all kinds of treaties. They referring to economic treaties, and this is not entirely unheard of. This is the kind of arrangement that they have in Belgium . For example, the Flemish region in Belgium is allowed to set up trade missions or enter into economic treaties with other countries.

Q. Like Quebec in Canada .

A. Yes, so let us bear in mind that the Philippines is not the only one that has an internal conflict in the whole world. So maybe we should learn at how this kind of problem has been tackled in other parts of the world. So I think that’s what the GRP and the MILF panels have borne in mind. And if I’m not mistaken, they’ve also mentioned Northern Ireland , for example, when it comes to a need to reexamine the Constitutional framework to resolve the conflict.

Q. It’s good you mentioned the Flemish territory in Belgium . But doesn’t it cause a lot of tension within Belgium ?

A. The tension that I’ve heard in Belgium is actually being managed by these sort of accommodations or arrangements. Because the Waloon region [of Belgium] can always tell the Flemish, why go for separation when you already enjoying these sovereign privileges? And I guess that’s what both the GRP and MILF panels had in mind when they agreed on this MOA-AD. I suppose what they were thinking was that, there would be no use, for now, to secede because all of these genuine…sort of tools would now be afforded or accorded to you rather than paper autonomy.

Q. But look at what’s happening now, when you see the MILF acting in a belligerent way, just because they’re frustrated, ,maybe this, to them, hopefully a hiccup in the peace talks, and then they finally give up all hope and resort to violence again. What does it say about giving a group like this the kind of powers that are contained in a MOA-AD? Isn’t it dangerous?

A. I will be frank with you. We ourselves are finding it hard to pacify these armed forces. We need to appeal for them to hold back, all the armed groups because, as they were saying, ‘We thought you said we should give negotiations a chance. We’ve been talking already for 12 years. We’ve already faced two all-out offensives already and then it ends up nowhere.’ We in civil society are finding it hard to pacify these armed groups. And I’m not just talking about the MILF, I’m also talking about the AFP. Our work is made much harder when we hear about much-publicized statements from our political leaders who say, if the MOA-AD is signed, there will be bloodshed, which we find completely illogical. Because what they’re saying is, if there’s a peace agreement, there won’t be peace. There will not be any peace. Whereas we are saying, if there’s a peace agreement, there will be peace.

Q. Let me play devil’s advocate. If you say it’s hard to pacify these groups, what we’ve seen is it’s the MILF that has been provoking these all-out wars. So it’s the MILF that is more difficult to restrain than the AFP.

A. I don’t want to take sides. I just want to say that when it comes to military solutions…we hear so many people say now, it’s time to go all out against the MILF. What I want to remind everyone is that every time we adopt a military solution, it never works. Remember that in the 1970s, we were under martial law, and President Marcos, with all the resources and powers he had in his hand, could not crush a hastily organized rebel army with very little training, with no battlefield experience, with very minimal equipment. And the military went against them during martial law. Here we are, three decades later, they are far more experienced, they have more equipment, what makes us think that they cannot put up a fight? What I’m afraid of is, they fought for two weeks in North Cotabato , we already have 160,000 internally-displaced refugees, extrapolate then. Let’s assume they continue fighting for two or three months. How many thousands or millions of refugees will we have? Remember, in year 2000, we had one million internally-displaced people, and these were World Bank and government figures.  In comparison, Bosnia only had 600,000, East Timor only had 300,000. What I’m trying to say is, if we do not deescalate the situation, we might end up becoming the Darfur [in Sudan] of southeast Asia.

Q. Right now, we have a Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). So far, we haven’t heard from it. If that committee does its job, then it should defuse the situation.

A. I remember one instance when I talked to a member of the CCCH. This was about Cotabato. This was when a Civilian Volunteer Organization and the MILF were fighting. The MILF were farmers in that area; the CVO members were also farmers in the barangay. There was fighting and it was reported to the Joint Ceasefire Committee. The committee came in and it was told by the CVOs, “We don’t recognize any captain. We don’t recognize any ceasefire committee.” So, the problem is, the public in Manila who don’t know any better, who are not immersed on the ground, who don’t know what’s happening, it’s very easy for them to be manipulated. It’s very easy for public opinion to be manipulated nowadays. Because we know that in times of war, the first casualty is truth. I would advise our friends in media to get a direct line to the CCCH so we will know what’s really happening. Let’s not rely…our sources of information should not depend on groups that are taking advantage of the conflict. We have so many groups who feel that their interests, whether economic or political, will be affected negatively by the peace process. I’ve always said the reason why there’s still no signing of a peace agreement is that….I’ve always said that if the government panel, as well as the MILF panel were left on their own to decide if they should sign the agreement, they would have done that two years ago. They just couldn’t sign it because they’re afraid. There are powerful economic and political forces who genuinely feel that their interests, political and economic may be adversely affected by the Mindanao peace process. Because we are talking here of returning the ancestral domain of the Moros themselves. Now, let’s ask ourselves: who are enjoying now the fruits of these ancestral domain? Who owns the mineral rights? Who has tens of thousands of hectares per DENR records in Mindanao ? How would you think they feel, now that the government is about to return the ancestral domain back to the Moros?

Q. But were they consulted in the first place?

A. If they had been consulted, what do you think they would say? Our friends in Zamboanga are complaining, they’re saying they were not consulted. But later, they said, they were. And they’ve said no. Apparently, what they mean by consultation is, to them, they are consulted if the government takes their position. In layman’s term, when we ask, what do you think? It doesn’t necessarily mean that I would have to adopt your position. But to them, they say that since they have already expressed their views in a public forum, albeit informally, their position is, the government should adopt their position. The problem is, if you’re in the GRP or MILF panel, if you try to accommodate everyone’s interest into this agreement, without asking anyone to make sacrifices or compromises, we will never arrive at any peace agreement. And what we saw today, it will continue to grow.

Q. How can this be resolved? The President has already ordered an all-out offensive. The military says it’s not going to stop because it’s already got the upper hand. Even local officials say it’s got to stop now. When do you think it’s going to stop?

A. I myself am hoping everything dies down, everbody calms down. How is it going to stop? There has to be…we have to show to everyone that there is a big constituency for peace. As of now, what’s being given air space and print space are the anti-MOA and the MILF. And both of them are either saying, if there’s no MOA, there’s going to be war. Or if there’s MOA, there’s going to be war. Right? Perhaps, it’s about time, the silent majority, if there is really a silent majority in support of the peace process, or the peaceful resolution of the conflict, maybe now is the time, now more than ever is the time for us to come out and say to everyone, say to these groups, say to those who would rather resolve the conflict by armed means, ‘Wait, there’s a big constituency in support of a peaceful resolution of whatever grievances, Bangsamoro grievances you have there.’